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In the last three decades, most of the existing literature using regression analysis to 
explore the effects of trade on development has conferred the first one a leading role in 
directly determining cross-country differences on income. Indeed, this should come at 
surprise, since what trade theory predicts and what results from General Equilibrium Models 
(an econometric-alternative quantitative tool) recently display are not completely aligned 
with conventional empirical evidence at hand. According to these sources, the effects of trade 
liberalization on welfare are indirect, transmitted through several channels, and dependent on 
multiple initial conditions. Much of such discrepancy may be due to measurement error and 
omitted variable problems, data limitations, and methodological shortcomings presented in 
regression analysis. On one hand, there is agreement over the fact that conventional proxies 
of trade openness contain severe measurement errors. In addition, data on control variables 
affecting well-being and believed to be correlated with trade became available just recently. 
On the other hand, and more importantly, the search for a possible contingent or conditional 
relationship between free trade and well-being has not been a priority in the agenda of 
  
mainstream literature with the exception of sporadic and isolated studies, despite the fact that 
trade theory has long recognized that possibility. Using newly developed policy-oriented 
measures of trade integration built with information from tariff rates, non-tariff-barriers, and 
subsidies, and controlling by multidimensional policy areas beyond those found in 
conventional literature, this study finds evidence of a contingent relationship between trade 
openness and well-being. More specifically, this investigation arrives at two conclusions. 
First, unilateral or one-way-street trade liberalization is not associated with higher levels of 
well-being, showing neither a direct impact nor a conditional one in the presence of 
complementary conditions. Second, gains in international market access, or multilateral trade 
openness, do not alone guarantee the achievement of higher levels of well-being, but do 
demonstrate significant potential for development in the presence of favorable internal 
conditions, such as those linked to business competitiveness and market efficiency, the 
promotion and respect of political rights among the citizenry, and the less concentrated 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
In the last three decades, most of the existing literature using regression 
analysis to explore the effects of trade on development has conferred the first one a 
leading role in directly determining cross-country differences on income. Indeed, this 
should come at surprise, since what trade theory predicts and what results from 
General Equilibrium Models (GEM’s), an econometric-alternative quantitative tool, 
recently display are not completely aligned with conventional empirical findings at 
hand. Evidence from GME’s, recently used to assess the impact of unilateral, 
bilateral, and multilateral trade reform on economic aggregates as well as wages and 
poverty, show that the effects of trade liberalization on welfare are indirect, 
transmitted through several channels, and dependent on multiple initial conditions. 
(Hertel, Preckel, and Reimer, 2001; Hertel, Ivanic, Preckel, Cranfield, and Martin, 
2003; Ganuza, Morley, Robinson, Vos, 2005; Bussolo and Lay, 2003; Bussolo and 
Mensbrugghe, 2006). This investigation believes that much of such mismatch or 
discrepancy found in different empirical sources may be due to measurement error 
and omitted variable problems, data limitations, and methodological shortcomings 
presented in regression analysis. 
 
In fact, from the perspective of exploring the potentialities of trade integration 
on well-being, the existing literature using regression analysis exposes three main 
limitations. First, the use of broader and alternative measures of welfare to 




exclusively on the impact of trade openness on GDP related indicators, such as 
economic growth or income per capita levels, a linked but different exercise. Second, 
the use of policy-oriented indicators, built with information from tariff rates, NTB’s, 
and trade-restraining subsidies to measure trade openness is non-existent. Instead, as 
discussed earlier, conventional literature in the field has employed outcome-oriented 
proxies of trade protection that contain significant measurement errors. Third, the 
search for a possible contingent or conditional relationship between free trade and 
well-being has not been a priority in the agenda of mainstream literature with the 
exception of sporadic and isolated studies, despite the fact that trade theory has long 
recognized that possibility. The stock of related research has mainly targeted its 
attention on finding a direct, unique and unambiguous association between trade 
openness and average wealth, but it has not considered the possibility of a conditional 
connection between both variables.  
 
This study hopes to contribute to reconciling trade theory and empirical 
evidence on trade and development, by contributing to correct measurement error and 
omitted variable problems, and testing for a conditional relationship between both 
variables. In particular, it adds three innovative components with respect to the 
existing literature: (1) the inclusion of infant mortality and life expectancy rates as 
alternative indicators of quality of life; (2) the use of two policy-oriented measures of 
trade integration: unilateral trade openness (trade restrictions imposed by each 
country on imports, which are mainly influenced by domestic trade policy) and 




good proxy of each country’s international market access, largely the result of dual 
and multiparty negotiations). Both are built with information from tariff rates, NTB’s, 
and trade-restraining subsidies (including those adopted in the agricultural sector). 
Finally, the investigation searches for (3) a possible contingent or conditional 
relationship between free trade and well-being by including relevant interaction 
variables in different model specifications. Using this methodological framework, the 
investigation test the hypothesis that maybe trade integration has the potential to 
unleash positive economic and social benefits only if certain conditions, within 
and outside the reach of national governments, are in place. 
 
What are those conditions? For testing the main hypothesis, three “clubs” of 
internal conditions with the potential of shaping the impact of trade integration on 
well-being have been differentiated. The first group is integrated by internal 
conditions with probed major impact on economic growth according to conventional 
literature, which mainly includes variables determining business competitiveness and 
market efficiency such as public infrastructure, financial depth, stock of human 
capital, level of technological development, the rule of law, and the protection of 
property rights. The potential impact of opening up the economy on average living 
standards could vary significantly depending on the magnitude of cross-the-border 
differences in factor productivity, transaction costs, and overall country-risk.  
 
Variables believed to favor a more equal distribution of wealth and 




internal factors facilitates the inclusion of individuals -as citizens in the political arena 
and as consumer-producer agents in formal markets- by providing them with rights, 
resources and capabilities to take advantage of new opportunities. Among them stand 
out the practice of democratic values and the exercise of basic political rights. 
Democracy, even in its more incipient versions, secures a minimum exercise of 
checks and balances within the government branches. This feature, combined to basic 
political rights as free speech and the independence of the press, allows most of the 
government actions and policies to be scrutinized and the demands of the population 
to be heard. In this setting, rent seeking practices and economic and social policies 
favoring exclusive groups of society are censored and limited in comparison to other 
political frameworks. As Sen (1994) asserts, no famine has occurred in a democracy, 
and particularly, in a society enjoying free press.  
 
All factors contained in the first two “clubs” are susceptible to change in the 
presence of active policymaking. National governments, with narrow or broad 
margins, could make a difference in the short, medium or large run if politically 
engaged on these reforms. However, there is a vector of factors imposed by destiny 
and history with significant potential to shape the effects of trade integration on 
human progress. These initial conditions, rigid to vary over time, have recently 
gained more attention as important determinants of economic and social 
development. This third “club” is composed by geography (i.e. distance to 




As explained in the course of this investigation, all variables contained in the last 
group have been linked to structural inequality in the existing literature. 
 
The testing of the main hypothesis may have significant policy implications. 
Because trade integration involves deep changes in the distribution of economic and 
social benefits and burdens across societies, its impact needs to be addressed. 
Addressing such a complex interaction, however, requires a good understanding of 
the true nature of the relationship between the forces shaping globalization and those 
fostering development. Only after that, effective policies, at the national and 
international level, could be designed and implemented with the primary goal to 
reduce the already existent but increasing tensions created by the new economic 
model.  
 
The results reported by this study insinuates the kind of free trade policies 
with greater potential to positively affect living standards, and the circumstances 
under which those policies may enhance their potentialities for human progress. 
Particularly, this study finds evidence of a contingent relationship between trade 
openness and well-being. It arrives at two conclusions. First, unilateral or one-way-
street trade liberalization is not associated with higher levels of well-being, 
showing neither direct nor conditional impact in the presence of complementary 
conditions. Only the interaction term between unilateral trade openness and structural 
inequality is significant when regressed against income, which indicates that one-




standards in highly unequal countries. Interestingly, in theory the interaction of the 
forces from both variables can actually yield such result: because one-sided trade 
liberalization produces mainly redistributive effects on income, in countries where 
socio-economic assets and opportunities are concentrated the “winners” from changes 
in trade policy are probable those possessing major financial and political resources to 
influence public policy. 
 
Second, multilateral trade openness does not alone guarantee the 
achievement of higher levels of well-being, but do show significant potentialities 
for development in the presence of favorable internal conditions. More 
specifically, variables associated with the achievement of business competitiveness 
and market efficiency (first “Club”) seem to complement gains in international 
market access in rising cumulative welfare indicators such as average income, but not 
distributional ones, like life expectancy, indicator that changes on the margin. The 
reason behind this logic is simple: market efficiency assures output maximization, but 
not necessarily equal distribution. On the contrary, the exercise of specific democratic 
practices (second “Club) promotes a better distribution of the benefits created by the 
access to larger markets, but appears to have a not significant role in inducing higher 
average incomes under two-sided trade integration. And that could be because 
democratic regimes, though displaying no clear income-generating forces, as a 
minimum guarantee the respect for some basic values (i.e. free expression, voice, 
accountability), which facilitates the channeling of wide-ranging demands for better 




sided trade reform, structural inequality hurts both average income and life 
expectancy rates.  Because in most cases structural inequality operates as proxy of the 
distribution of overall opportunities (social, economic and political), it is believed to 
affect negatively well-being through three channels: restrictions for market 
development, limits in access to credit, and tendencies observed in medium voter 
preferences. All these anticipated results are coherent with evidence registered in 
existing literature. In this sense, the most valuable message from this investigation 
lies on the importance that both the reciprocal access to international markets and the 
pursuit of policy complementarities should receive in the external and internal 
political debate about free trade and development. 
 
The investigation is structured as follows. Chapter 2 explores the economic, 
social, and political forces behind global trade integration in the last thirty years. It 
also examines the magnitude of trade liberalization in a more integrated world. The 
theoretical and empirical links between trade openness and well-being are discussed 
in Chapter 3. It carefully examines findings, contributions, and limitations of existing 
literature. One of the main conclusions of the analysis lies on the necessity of looking 
for a conditional or contingent association between the liberalization of trade and 
living standards, as trade theory and alternative empirical research suggest. The 
fourth chapter contains the study’s conceptual proposal. It describes, explains, and 
shows data justifying the incorporation of new and relevant information to address the 




employed as well as a summary of the expected results. Chapter 6 concludes and 










Chapter 2: Global Trading: A More Integrated World 
 
 
The phenomenon of globalization is attracting the attention of most scholars 
in the field of development. Understood as an inexorable process of trade integration, 
increasing capital flow mobility, labor force movements –even in the presence of 
highly restrictive immigration laws in recipient countries-, and impressive expansion 
of information and technology, globalization is progressively eroding national 
boundaries with profound and permanent effects on people’s lives worldwide. Its 
occurrence is also redefining the approach of the international community toward the 
global environment and the political management of armed conflicts and 
humanitarian crisis around the world. Because globalization involves deep changes in 
the distribution of economic and social benefits and burdens across societies, its 
impact needs to be addressed.  
 
Trade openness has played a decisive role in triggering global integration. 
Countries in the developed and the developing world have increasingly embraced the 
idea of unlocking their domestic markets to external competition under the 
assumption that trade integration is a win-win solution. According to this view – 
mostly inspired by classical trade theory-, given the fact that economies possess 
different factor endowments (i.e. capital and labor), trade liberalization would 
inevitably force participants of free trade to fully exploit their competitive advantages 




abundant factor. As a result, the more efficient allocation of resources across borders 
would lead to a general commodity price reduction and factor-price equalization. The 
foundations of these principles derive from the works of Smith (1766) and Ricardo 
(1817), and more recently from the Heckscher-Ohlin model (1933).  
 
Classical economics has also given supporters of global free trade the 
opportunity to base their case on strong moral grounds: poor countries are supposed 
to benefit the most from trade integration. Because labor is the relatively abundant 
factor in developing countries, trade liberalization would result in the progressive 
increase of relative wages in these economies. In addition, as factor costs narrow 
across economies, production should also converge progressively, allowing low-
income countries to eventually bridge the gap in living standards. Existing market 
size and purchasing power asymmetries between rich and poor economies would also 
allow the latter larger gains from market access, and the increasing probabilities of 
benefiting from economies of scale. Besides, technology transmission mainly through 
the expansion of manufactured and high-tech imports–which has been found to be 
one of the most effective trade-related drivers of economic growth- would favor in 
greater proportion poor countries engaged in free trade (Wacziarg, 2001). 
 
Section 1: Beyond Theory: The Role of Local and Global Political Economy 
 
Even though classic trade theory has been used by supporters of globalization 




global political economy played a much greater role in diminishing trade protection 
worldwide. At the national level, several circumstances favoring the implementation 
of free trade policies converged, particularly in developing countries. On one side, the 
reputation of the traditionally protected industries as driven forces to general 
prosperity was undermined, in part because the preferential commercial treatment 
granted to them was not resulting in tangible economic and social benefits to the 
average voter. Local producers were increasingly perceived as inefficient and less 
competitive in comparison to their foreign counterparts. The import-substitution 
model that championed the development of infant industries as a key component of 
its strategy for development gradually lost credibility (Rodrik, 1994a). Also, 
restrictive trade policy was identified as an indivisible component of the “traditional, 
old fashioned” growth model, which had failed in delivering progress in a continuous 
and an equitable manner. On the other side, progressive democratization across 
developing countries contributed to change the trade policy standpoints, from a 
producer-oriented to a consumer-oriented perspective. A more educated, better 
informed, and politically organized and empowered citizen became a more exigent 
consumer. Issues related to product quality, diversity and price level gained visibility 
and generated extensive popular support for trade liberalization in these societies1.  
 
                                                 
1 The relationship between democracy and trade openness could also be endogenous. Lopez-Cordova 
and Meissner (2005) report empirical evidence suggesting a two-way street relationship between both 
variables: democracies are more likely to enact free trade policies (democratic transitions are 
accompanied by the emergence of a middle class with increasing demands not only for additional 
political but also consumer rights) but trade integration may deepen democratic practices through its 




These growing sentiments were able to be politically carried out because of 
the confluence of two significant events: the finding of tariff-alternative fiscal 
revenue sources as emerging economies went through broad pro-market economic 
reforms, and, most importantly, the circumstances under which the decision to 
embark in trade liberalization reform was made. Alike rich nations, where trade 
barrier reductions seem to be the result of an endogenous process (countries 
implement further tariff liberalization as they industrialize), in most developing 
nations trade reform took place when these economies were experiencing deep 
macroeconomic and social unrest, in the aftermath of the debt crisis of the eighties 
and the fall of the Berlin Wall. In that scenario, deep economic crisis relegated 
distributional considerations to second place behind economy-wide concerns, and 
therefore, allowed an agenda-setting government to sneak in trade policy reforms 
alongside macroeconomic reforms (Rodrik, 1994b)2.  
 
At the global level, since the early nineties pressures for trade liberalization 
escalated as the most developed nations -particularly the United States- redefined its 
geopolitical relationship with the developing world based on the idea that shared 
economic and social prosperity through free trade assure global security. According 
to this new approach, by triggering economic growth in low-income countries, trade 
integration not only could lead to progressive poverty reduction but also could 
produce a cohort of more educated citizens with strong incentives to expand their 
political rights, deepen democracy, and build better institutions. Integration to 
                                                 
2 Graham and Sukhtankar (2004) offer further evidence from the Latin American experience 
supporting the idea that economic and social crisis may have played a key role in cementing support 




international markets would also compel developing countries to commit to certain 
domestic policies leading to macroeconomic stability, sound fiscal practices and 
improvements in the protection of property rights. In the end, global progress would 
translate into global security.  
 
Impetuses for trade liberalization were operationalized through three channels: 
unilateral reductions of trade barriers, the launching of multilateral trade negotiations, 
and the proliferation of regional and bilateral free trade agreements at global scale. In 
recent decades, one-sided trade openness policies –although at different degrees of 
implementation- were conducted by developing countries as part of broader economic 
liberalization programs. Since 1975, according to Wacziarg and Welch (2003), 73 
countries have undergone pro market economic reforms among which openness to 
trade was a main component; of these, 46 undertook such reforms after 1990.  
 
Influential international organizations, particularly the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB), have also played a significant role in 
promoting unilateral trade liberalization. Financial and technical support granted to 
developing countries by these institutions has been conditioned to the implementation 
of a set of structural reforms, among which trade liberalization constitutes an essential 
one. Country cases in which the IMF and WB used their leverage to dismantle trade 
barriers are found in Latin America, Africa and South Asia, but particularly notorious 
-because of the speed and depth with which the reforms were undertaken- are the 




On the other hand, multilateral trade negotiations have gradually benefited 
from expanded country membership and coverage of trade related areas since the 
establishment of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 19483. 
Although multiparty talks were conceived as the best option to unlock markets across 
borders in the fastest and broadest manner, recent stagnation in the negotiations -
reflecting differences between the North and South hemispheres in the treatment of 
the agricultural sector- provoked the proliferation of regional and bilateral trade 
agreements as a source of competition for multilateral trade liberalization. 250 
preferential trade agreements were notified to the WTO by year 2002, 130 of which 
after 1995; by the end of 2005, if agreements reportedly planned or already under 
negotiation are concluded, the total number in force might approach 300 (WTO, 
2006)4. Of particular interest are those trade initiatives launched by developed 
nations, the United States and the European Union, with emerging economies5. As a 
result, by the beginning of the 21st century, intensive worldwide trade negotiation has 
not resulted in a global free trade area, but rather in profuse bilateral commercial 
relations resembling a spaghetti bowl. 
                                                 
3 Since the establishment of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1948, multilateral 
trade agreements have progressively benefited from expanded membership. 23 countries (10 developed 
vs. 13 developing) participated in the Geneva Round in 1948; 62 (23 vs. 39) in the Kennedy Round in 
1962-67; 80 (26 vs. 54) in the Tokyo Round in 1973-79; 97 (26 vs. 71) in the Uruguay Round in 1986-
93; and 149 (26 vs. 123) in the Doha Round in 2001-06, under the guidance of the newly 
institutionalized World Trade Organization (WTO). Also, new trade sectors have progressively been 
included in the negotiations, from tariffs (Kennedy Round, 1962) and non-tariff barriers (Tokyo 
Round, 1973) to services (Uruguay Round, 1986)
4 Preferential Trade Agreements (PTA) includes common markets, custom unions, single markets and 
Free Trade Agreements (FTA). 
5 Among the US trade initiatives with developing countries are the Free Trade Agreement of the 
Americas (FTAA), the Middle East Free Trade Area Initiative (MEFTA), the Enterprise for ASEAN 
Initiative, and the Southern African Customs Union Free Trade Agreement (SACU-FTA). The 
European Union is negotiating free trade agreements with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN), the Community of Andean Countries (CAN), Central America, the Common Southern 




Section 2: The Outcome : The Reduction of Trade Barriers 
 
As a consequence of the dynamics of local and global political economy, 
restrictive trade policies –in general- have gradually lost ground in both hemispheres. 
Tariffs, the most restraining and visible trade measure, shrunk worldwide in the last 
three decades. The average world tariff declined from 16.0% in 1975 to 6.5% in year 
2000 (Graph Nº 1)6. Even though average tariffs in the developing world still remain 
higher than those reported in rich countries (7.0% vs. 3.6%), reductions in average tax 
on imports in emerging economies have been remarkable (Graph Nº 2). Statistical 
evidence reveals that average global decreases have not been driven by particular 
cases (Graph Nº 3).  
 
 
On the other hand, the tendency over time followed by Non-Tariff Barriers 
(NTB’s) in the period 1975-2000 is not well known7. The lack of an internationally 
accepted definition and classification of NTB’s, the complexity involved in 
encapsulating different types of such policies (i.e. quotas and technical, sanitary and 
environmental-protective measures) into a single level of trade restrictiveness, and the 
methodological challenge to convert them in terms of import value, have made it 
extremely difficult for international organizations and scholars to keep a statistical 
                                                 
6 Average tariffs have been calculated as the ratio between total import duties and total imports. 
Source: World Development Indicators. World Bank. 
7 According to the Coding System of Trade Control Measures (TCMCS) – a body of the United 
Nations Commission for Trade and Development (UNCTAD)- Non-Tariff Barriers (NTB’s), also 
known as Non-Tariff Measures (NTM), include the following categories of policies: price control, 




track of NTB’s over time8. Data for 96 countries are available only from 1996 to 
2005, although each one registers in average one observation for the whole period.  
 
Although data limitations exist, three conclusions about the evolution of 
NTB’s in the period under analysis have emerged. First, the decline in absolute terms 
in non-tariff measures has been remarkably slower and much less extensive in 
comparison to that observed in tariff rates. Second, their relative importance and 
visibility as trade-restrictive instrument has considerably increased due to the degree 
of tariff liberalization across countries in recent decades. In the second half of the 
nineties, NTB’s, on average, added an additional 70% to the level of trade 
restrictiveness imposed by tariffs (Kee, Nicita and Olarreaga, 2005). Finally, other 
modalities of NTB’s have surfaced –particularly antidumping measures and Rules of 
Origin (ROO)-, which, originally designed to assure fair trade, have been 
progressively considered as political economy instruments to offset the benefits of 
tariff liberalization9. Based on a 155 cross-country gravitational model, Estevadeordal 




                                                 
8 Only after the mid nineties, UNCTAD began the Trade Analysis and Information System (TRAINS), 
a database containing the most complete, reliable and comprehensive information about NTB’s.  
9 In its most general concept, Rules of Origin (ROO) define the minimum value added produced within 
the preferential agreement area a good must contain to be conferred the favored tariff treatment. In 
theory, ROO avoids that parties out of the trade agreement utilize preferential areas as transshipping 
platforms. However, when highly severe and inflexible, ROO could offset tariff liberalization benefits 
by forcing local producers to rely extensively on local inputs, sometimes more expensive and of lower 
quality. The use of ROO has dramatically increased due to the proliferation of bilateral preferential 




Finally, the gradual abandonment in the use of monetary policy as a tool to 
promote export-oriented strategies -with the prominent exception of China- has 
clearly facilitated international trade flows over time. Political, economic and social 
distress caused by the persistence of local authorities in sustaining fixed-exchange 
regimes have become more visible in the aftermath of recent global financial crises. 
Even under low-risk scenarios, freer capital and more dynamic trade flows have 
increased the economic trade-offs that national governments face when monetary 
policy is subordinated to trade policy. From the early seventies to the beginning of the 
nineties –a period in which a significant number of emerging economies implemented 
broad economic liberalization programs- 33 developing countries abandoned fixed 
exchange regimes, a sign revealing the lesser degrees of freedom emerging 
economies possess to manipulate exchange rates. The tendency in favor of more 
flexible exchange policies was interrupted in the mid nineties but regained dynamism 
at the end of the decade, as a consequence of the Asian crisis in 1997-98 (Graph Nº 
4). 
 
In summary, even tough it is not clear if recent waves of globalization have 
favored the expected changes on NTB’s in terms of flexibility and scope towards free 
trade, both the persistent, substantial and widespread decreases in tariff rates –the 
most trade-restrictive measure- and the increasing abandonment of monetary policy 
as a trade policy instrument have resulted in a remarkable retreat of global trade 






Chapter 3: Trade Integration and Well-Being 
 
 
In world history, very few times national and global forces have coincided and 
committed to push a common international policy agenda as for free markets and 
trade integration at the end of the twentieth century. As mentioned earlier, trade 
liberalization policies have been embraced worldwide not only because they were 
conceived as a win-win solution but also because they were supposed to facilitate 
developing countries to growth, to achieve higher living standards in favor of their 
poor population and, therefore, to help them to converge or bridge the gap with rich 
nations. Besides, this sentiment was not exclusively rooted in national and global 
political authorities; at the beginning of the 21st century, six out of ten people around 
the globe perceived globalization, broadly conceived, as beneficial for human 
progress (World Economic Forum, 2002). 
 
Section 1: Is There an Empirical Link Between Trade Openness and Well-Being? 
 
However, after almost three decades of progressive free trade policy 
implementation, increasing doubts about the beneficial impact of trade openness on 
economic and social well-being have emerged in both the academic sphere and the 
public realm. Wide-ranging voices, from laureate economists to displaced workers 
and peasants in the streets of Manila and La Paz, are not much convinced that 




benefits. The lack of association between trade liberalization and improvements in 
indicators of quality of life -such as education, health and other living standards- 
appears more evident in developing countries, which paradoxically were supposed to 
benefit the most from global trade integration.  
 
In fact, a first look at cross-country data reveals no correlation between 
changes in trade policy and changes in selected indicators of well-being in recent 
decades. Graph Nº 5 exhibits the partial correlation between average annual changes 
in tariff rates and average annual changes in a set of indicators of quality of life over 
the period 1980-1995: infant mortality rate at birth, life expectancy, an index of 
education achievement and the Human Development Index (HDI)10. Each equation 
was controlled by the initial level of the dependent variable. 
 
At first glance, changes in trade policy –measured as the average annual 
variation in tariff rates- appear to explain little about the evolution of health, 
education and human development conditions across countries in the last three 
decades 11. Among the four regressions shown, only those linking trade integration to 
infant mortality rates and the HDI show statistical significance at 95% level of 
                                                 
10 The education achievement index is composed by the illiteracy level (with a weight of 2/3) and the 
simple average of primary, secondary, and tertiary enrollment rates (1/3). The HDI was created by the 
United Nations (UN) in 1990 and included as a central piece in its Human Development Report, an 
annual UN publication. The HDI was built on the basis of three components: life expectancy at birth, 
academic achievement, and standard of living, measured as the real GDP per capita adjusted for 
purchasing power parity (PPP). See Appendix Nº 1 for further details. 
11 Data show the same results when analyzing the period 1975-2000, but sample is severely restricted 





confidence. However, by taking away just a couple of outliers from the tales of both 
variables’ distribution, any trace of statistical significance evaporates12. 
 
Alternative sources to explore the association between trade openness 
measures and any dimension of well-being different than average income are difficult 
to find. Surprisingly, although the existing substantial research on trade integration, 
very few studies in the field have focused their attention in disentangling the linkages 
between both variables. Shortage in the area of cross-country regression analysis is 
even more notorious. Among these few writings, the work by Wei and Wu (2004) is 
the closest analysis dealing with the effect of trade liberalization on alternative 
indicators of quality of life. Using five-year intervals for the period 1982-1997, they 
examine the association between a couple of measures of trade openness -tariff rates 
and trade to GDP ratio- and health outcomes, in particular, life expectancy and infant 
mortality. Panel regression analysis reports some evidence on the correlation between 





Section 2: Trade Openness and Income : A Related Question 
 
Instead, most economists in the field have been more interested in answering a 
related but somewhat different question: does trade integration promote economic 
growth and/or higher average incomes? And the inquiry, although receiving great 
                                                 




attention, is still wide open. Methodological drawbacks regarding the measurement of 
the main independent variable and the shortcomings in dealing with reverse causality 
problems in the relationship between some indicators of trade openness and income 
have brought skepticism about the existing empirical evidence. At this point, it is 
important to distinguish between two related but different questions: (1) Does trade 
volumes affect well-being?, and (2) Does trade policy have an impact on well-being? 
Clearly, from a policy prescription standpoint the interest of the present investigation 
lies on answering the second question. Trade flows, as discussed later, depend on 
multiple factors, some of them far beyond the reach of national governments. Trade 
policy is susceptible to be designed, shaped, implemented, and evaluated.  
 
After examining in detail the most influential studies that attribute to outward-
oriented trade policy significant weight in explaining income differences across 
countries, Rodrik and Rodriguez (2000) conclude that the results reported in all of 
them are mostly driven by the use of either proxies of trade openness that are highly 
correlated with other sources of economic performance or poor measures of trade 
barriers. Among the former stand out variables measuring the extent of the black 
market premium and distortions in the exchange rate, which mirror more accurately 
the consequences of bad monetary and fiscal practices rather than those of trade 
policy. The study focuses on eight papers: Dollar (1992), Ben-David (1993), Sachs 
and Warner (1995), Edwards (1998), Frankel and Romer (1999), Lee (1993), 
Harrison (1996) and Wacziarg (1998). In the following lines, the study will briefly 




regarding some of the existing literature. Conclusions from Dollar (1992) exclusively 
rely on the strong significance reported of the index of real exchange rate distortion, 
and the index of real exchange variability when regressed against income per capita. 
Those indexes, according to Dollar, capture information from trade policy since both 
relate to outward/inward orientations, by measuring if exchange rates are favorable to 
exporters and for how long. Rodrik and Rodriguez stress that three conditions must be 
satisfied to hold such argument, if: (1) there are no export taxes or subsidies in place, 
(2) there are no differences in national price levels due to transport costs, and (3) the 
law of one price holds continuously (local and international price differences are 
exclusively explain by transport costs). Obviously, the three conditions clash with 
reality. 
 
The influential paper also challenges results from Sachs and Warner (1995) 
that found a strong association between reductions in trade protection and average 
income, using an index of five different criteria to classify an economy as close\open 
to international markets. The Sachs-Warner indicator is a dummy variable, with a 
value of zero (close to trade) according to any one of the following criteria, if a 
economy: (1) had average tariff rates higher than 40%, (2) NTB’s cover more than 
40% of imports, (3) had a socialist economic system, (4) had a state monopoly for 
major exports, and (5) its black market premium exceeded 20% between the 1970’s 
and 1980’s. Using data provided by the authors, Rodrik and Rodriguez demonstrate 
that almost all of the information captured by the trade openness dummy comes from 




and the instability of black market premium explain more policy and institutional 
cross-country differences rather than differences in trade policy. Likewise, papers by 
Harrison (1996) and Wacziarg (1998) have been challenged for using some similar 
proxies for trade policy. 
 
The paper by Edwards (1998) is criticized in other grounds. The cited study, 
using nine different existing proxies of trade openness, finds six of them string and 
significant explaining factor productivity growth in weighted least squares 
regressions. The indicators for trade openness are: (1) the Sachs-Warner index, (2) the 
subjective World Bank’s trade strategy index, (3) the Edward-Leamer openness 
index, based on information on average residuals from trade flows regressions, (4) the 
black market premium, (5) average import tariffs, (6) coverage of NTB’s, (7) the 
subjective Heritage Foundation index of distortions in international trade, (8) trade 
duties as percentage of total trade (export plus imports), and (9) the Holger-Wolf’s 
regression-based index of import distortions for 1985. According Rodrik and 
Rodriguez, the use of GDP per capita levels in 1985 as weighting variable 
(presumably used to correct for heteroskedasticity) to run the least square regressions 
is behind the results. Given the fact that oil-exporter countries have high levels of 
income per capita, they were heavily weighted in the sample. If that information is 
combined with the fact that most of these countries remained relatively close to 
international markets and registered very low factor productivity growth in the 
eighties, then –as suggested by Rodrik and Rodriguez- it should not come to a 




productivity growth. In fact, when oil-exporter countries are taken out from the 
sample, such relationship disappears in all but three model specifications. 
 
The extensive use of trade shares to GDP as an indicator of trade openness, on 
the other hand, has received serious criticisms. The most damaging in disqualifying it 
as a good proxy for trade integration refers to the fact that it denotes trade outcomes, 
not policies, and the former are influenced by factors well beyond the decision 
making process such as complementary policies affecting economic growth, 
geographical variables (proximity to international markets, access to sea, initial 
natural endowments and country size) and demographic conditions (population 
density). Also, trade shares appear to be a poor proxy of trade openness in countries 
highly dependent on export-oriented commodities, since changes on sales overseas 
are significantly sensitive to variations in international commodity prices, as 
experienced over the past two decades (Birdsall and Hamoudi, 2002). In fact, the 
simple correlation coefficient between volumes of trade (exports plus imports) as 
portion of GDP and tariff rates –a variable that contains significant information about 
choices in trade policy- is very small (-0.08) in the period 1975-2000. 
 
An interesting common denominator found in the literature prone to 
attributing trade integration a decisive role in explaining income differences across 
countries is the fact that most of them do not use tariff rates and NTB’s –the best 
available variables containing relevant, although not complete, information about 




limitations. Cross-national average tariff rates are accessible from 1975 to 2004 but 
only 60 observations are reported at the beginning of that period, reaching a 
maximum of 97 countries in year 2000. Trade shares, in contrast, are available from 
1970 to 2004 with a sample size ranging from 128 to 166 observations, respectively, 
which makes them –for example- a good candidate to be employed in panel 
regression analysis. Another reasonable justification for the limited use of policy-
oriented measures is the methodological obstacles in aggregating different levels 
(tariffs) and forms (non-tariff policies) of protection into a single measure. Finally, a 
third reason why some fervent advocates of free trade make limited use of policy-
oriented measures as proxies of trade openness in regression analysis may be linked 
to what others have found when such specifications were included:  there is no direct, 
unambiguous relationship between tariff rates and NTB’s barriers, and incomes13. 
 
Section 3: The Nature of the Relationship Between Trade Openness and Well-Being: 
What Does the Theory Say? 
 
The uncertainty found in the existing literature about the nature of the 
relationship between trade integration and income should not come at surprise, since 
what the evidence actually displays goes hand in hand to what trade theory could 
sustain. As epitaph of one of the most comprehensive analysis about trade theory, 
Edward F. Buffie concludes, “If defenders of protection are too quick to dismiss the 
policy prescriptions of neoclassical economics, it is equally true that proponents of 
                                                 




export promotion have repeatedly made claims far stronger than either theory or 
empirical evidence can support…At present, far more is known about the 
consequences of bad trade policy than about the makeup of optimal trade policy” 
(2001,5).  
 
In this line of thinking, Bardhan (2006) summarizes plausible theoretical cases 
in which trade liberalization -contrary to what classical trade theory suggests- could 
lead to lower wages or incomes, among them: (a) in a Heckscher-Ohlin model, if a 
poor country possesses huge endowments of non-labor factors of production (i.e. 
mineral resources); (b) in a three-good model (non-tradable, exportable and 
importable), if some factors of production are not mobile across sectors (i.e. labor). 
Under this logic, for example, displaced workers due to external competition may 
face high restrictions to move to other occupations because of rigidities in the labor 
market such as inflexible laws, credit market imperfections and lack of access to 
retraining; (c) increased competition may encourage local producers to rely on low-
waged, less productive labor force to reduce costs; and, (d) cost pressures could 
persuade business to outsource some services, part of them from the informal sector, 
resulting in the substitution of formal jobs by low-waged ones.  
 
Existing differences in factor productivity among participants in free trade, no 
matter their initial factor endowments, could also substantially change the income-
convergence predictions of classical trade theory. As an example, Easterly (2004) 




higher relative productivity in this factor, allowing the wealthy economy to become 
labor-abundant and, therefore, to export labor-intensive goods. Under a scenario 
dominated by significant differences in labor and capital productivity in favor of 
developed countries, trade integration may foster income inequality among rich and 
poor countries rather than favoring their confluence. 
 
Results from trade theory models particularly applicable to developing 
countries go also against to what classical economics propose about the interactions 
between trade protection levels and income. Based on an optimizing dynamic model 
that incorporates export, import-competing and non-tradables production, Bufie 
(2001) build a theoretical framework for emerging economies that assumes 
underemployment, underinvestment and a governmental budget constraint at the 
initial equilibrium. To achieve the highest level of employment, two different trade 
policies can be chosen: an escalated tariff structure (low barriers to capital goods, 
medium to intermediate goods, and high to consumer goods) plus export promotion 
(subsidies) or import substitution, and then export promotion.  
 
Even only considering rich economies in the analysis, theory contemplates 
scenarios in which free trade could damage wage earners. This possibility has been 
clearly explained by Rodrik (1997) in his influential Has Globalization Gone Too 
Far? According to him, trade integration has altered labor markets in developed 
countries in two ways: it caused (1) the inward shift of the demand for low-skill labor 




potentially significant when trading with developing countries endowed with 
abundant low-skilled labor. Since most global trade engages only rich nations, this 
effect is expected to be small. However, the second effect takes place regardless the 
identity of the trade partners. The increase in the elasticity of the demand for low-
skilled labor makes easier for employers to substitute workers, by acquiring imports 
or investing abroad. As a consequence, worker’s power to bargain is severely 
damaged, increasing earnings volatility and reducing non-wage benefits. 
 
Therefore, according to what existing empirical evidence and trade theory 
have to say, there is no direct, unique, indisputable or unambiguous relationship 
between trade integration and increased income. Trade theory, however, is one step 
forward: at least, it has suggested the possibility of a contingent association regarding 
free trade and income, even identifying some of the conditions under which opening 
up the economy to international markets could translate into higher productivity and 
wages. Now, it is the turn of its research counterpart to try facing the same challenge.  
 
Section 4: New Challenges for Empirical Research: In Search of a Contingent 
Relationship Between Free Trade and Well-Being 
 
It is relatively easy to find theory models showing that the impact of trade 
liberalization on income depends on factors beyond trade policy. It is difficult to find 
empirical exercises testing for the same interaction. In fact, it was not until the end of 




about the possibility of an empirical conditional relationship between free trade and 
economic or alternative measures of well-being. In this direction, the Human 
Development Report 2005 dedicated significant attention in identifying external and 
internal conditions that countries should enjoy to unleash social benefits in a context 
of free trade. Among the former, multilateral and reciprocal “Rules of the Game” 
offer the greatest potential for human development at global scale. Unfortunately, the 
current dynamic in establishing rules governing international trade severely restricts 
low-income countries prospects for development since it imposes high market 
restrictions to their more competitive products and, at the same time, it constantly 
compels them to open their borders in a broader manner. But –the document 
continues-, even if fair, equally enforced international rules are taken for granted, 
trade liberalization still could not result in tangible social benefits in the absence of 
some within-country policy actions. This internal agenda to be implemented includes 
the development of an industrial and technological strategy, the adoption of a gradual 
tariff liberalization program, the inclusion of disadvantaged populations into formal 
markets through the provision of basic capabilities, the creation of safety nets, and the 
acceptance of social and environmental costs involved in international trade. 
Although the study offers an in-depth and comprehensive discussion of the 
conceptual framework regarding the nature of a conditional relationship between 
trade integration and human development, it presents no quantitative, cross-country 





Some empirical evidence backing the idea of a contingent interaction between 
trade openness and income is presented in Chang, Kaltani and Loayza (2005). Based 
on panel data growth regressions for the period 1960-2000 and using the Generalized 
Method of Moments (GMM) procedure to control for endogeneity problems and 
unobserved country-specific factors, the authors report a positive and strong effect of 
trade openness on economic growth, which is reinforced when certain levels of 
complementary, internal conditions are fulfilled, such as high school enrollment rates, 
commercial credit availability, access to basic public infrastructure, labor market and 
firm entry flexibility. The study describes the last three requirements as urgent since 
most developing countries have not achieved the minimum standards in those 
categories to experience economic gains from trade. Even though the investigation 
deserves the merit of opening what is expected to be an intense debate on a renewed 
nature of the interaction between trade and income, it reveals some important caveats. 
From the conceptual point of view, the study excludes external factors (i.e. the “Rules 
of the Game”) as determinant in the association between both variables and it focuses 
exclusively on the internal ones. Measurement errors, as explained above, are also 
persistent since trade shares to GDP are used as proxy to trade openness. In addition, 
to resort in the assumption that by-nature-time-varying-variables, such as institutional 
ones, have remained unchanged in the whole four-decade period under analysis (due 
to data availability problems) presents methodological and conceptual drawbacks. On 
one hand, it makes difficult to assess their impact on the dependent variable –unless 
more complicated and less reliable procedures are employed- since one of the main 




specific factors by eliminating the time-unvarying variables from the regression 
equation. Even if the time-unvarying variables are kept in the equation, their 
coefficients could not be identified in regression analysis. Furthermore, from a 
conceptual perspective, the assumption that institutional variables such as political 
regime, governance quality, labor market regulation, and firm-entry flexibility into 
markets have stayed unmoved in the last forty years lacks of empirical support and is 
not consistent with recent literature in the field of development that confers to 
changes in institutional factors a prominent role in explaining advances on progress. 
Finally, from the perspective of assessing the potentialities of international trade for 
human development, the study falls short in complementing the analysis by using a 
GDP-alternative measure of well-being as (possibly because it was beyond its 
purpose) as dependent variable and considering a wider spectrum of internal 








Chapter 4: Filling the Gap in Empirical Research: New Ways of 
Looking at the Relationship Between Trade Integration and 
Well-Being 
 
From the perspective of exploring the potentialities of trade integration on 
well-being, the existing literature exposes three main limitations. First, the use of 
broader and alternative measures of welfare to complement the analysis has been 
absent. The vast majority of studies has focused exclusively on the impact of trade 
openness on GDP related indicators, such as economic growth or income per capita 
levels, a linked but different exercise. Second, the use of policy-oriented indicators, 
built with information from tariff rates, NTB’s, and trade-restraining subsidies to 
measure trade openness is non-existent. Instead, as discussed earlier, conventional 
literature on the field has employed proxies of trade protection that contain significant 
measurement errors. Third, the search for a possible contingent or conditional 
relationship between free trade and well-being has not been a priority in the agenda 
of mainstream literature with the exception of sporadic and isolated studies, despite 
the fact that trade theory has long recognized that possibility. The stock of related 
research has mainly targeted its attention on finding a direct, unique and 
unambiguous association between trade openness and average wealth, but it has not 
considered the possibility of a conditional connection between both variables. In other 
words, the literature has not tested the hypothesis that maybe trade integration has the 




within and outside the reach of national governments are in place. The proposed 
research intents to fill these gaps. 
 
Section 1: Using Alternative Measures of Well-Being 
 
In spite of the multidimensional character of “quality of life”, for decades 
GDP per capita has primarily been used to measure aspects of well-being. For many 
economists, paraphrasing Daniel Cohen (2006), “a nation’s gross domestic product is 
the alpha and omega of economic development”. There appear to be two main 
reasons behind this preference. The first one responds to statistical matters. National 
income indicators have certain demonstrated advantages for statistical analysis, such 
as its broad spatial and temporal coverage and the lower probability of measurement 
errors that facilitates its use in comparative analysis. There are also practical reasons. 
GDP per capita, which is measured in monetary units, is a concept that is understood 
by and convenient for politicians, business people, and citizens in general. The 
simplicity in which it is communicated adds to its attractiveness. GDP per capita is, 
for many people, an exceptional simple way to express an extremely complex 
concept: the status of quality of life. In addition, GDP related measures are analogous 
to the system used to elaborate national accounts and, therefore, they can be easily 
associated with most macroeconomic indicators. 
 
Although its expanded usage, extensive empirical evidence suggests that 




changes in production per capita do not always go at the same rhythm, and, in some 
cases, even in the same direction. Some evidence reveals that, despite aggregate 
growth at the national level, poverty, unemployment, underemployment, and social 
exclusion could persist and, in some cases, continue to increase. In Latin America, for 
example, disappointing social results contrast with continuing economic growth 
registered in the last four decades, with the sole exception of the era dominated by the 
debt crisis in the eighties. Using data from 20 countries -17 of which are Latin 
American-, Foster and Székely (2001) show that, on average, the incomes of the 
poorest population not only did not grow at the same speed as GDP per capita, but 
also they improved at a considerably lower rate in comparison to high-income 
families. The diagnosis of the nineties is even worse. In average, 15% real growth in 
GDP per capita in the region contrasts with the expansion of unemployment and the 
return of poverty rates to levels observed at the beginning of the decade (Rey de 
Marulanda and Guzman, 2003). If the least favored do not benefit pari passu with 
economic growth or aggregate consumption, advances in production will solve the 
problem of poverty very slowly, if at all. In the same direction, Anand and Ravallion 
(1993) assert that the importance of growth rests on how its benefits are distributed in 
the community, and to what degree growth improves the provision of public services. 
 
A straightforward explanation to the discrepancies observed in advances in 
well-being and those in average national income indicators rely on the fact that the 
concept of GDP was not created to measure social and distributional improvements. It 




policy makers to diagnostic potential recessive economic cycles. As Paul Samuelson 
(1998) pointed out, the importance of the GDP is rooted in the fact that “it provides a 
general vision of the state of the economy… [and] allows one to judge whether the 
economy is contracting or expanding”. The United States was the first country in 
publishing a series of GDP figures in 1937, in an effort to understand the overall 
economic situation and to test alternative expansionary policies in face of the 
traumatic effects of the Great Depression14. At the beginning of the 1940s, the use of 
GDP related measures gained more relevance as they were utilized as inputs to plan 
military expenses in the context of the Second World War and the subsequent 
reconstruction of Europe through the Marshall Plan. In the next decade, when growth 
theory gained increasing followers and international organizations came into place as 
guardians of monetary and fiscal stability, the notion of GDP acquired mounting 
relevance for comparative analysis across countries and regions.  
 
Given the limitations of GDP-related variables as indicators of quality of life, 
complementary and alternative measures of welfare are needed to deepen the analysis 
about the links between trade openness and well-being. For that purpose, two 
conventional measures of quality of life, infant mortality and life expectancy rates, 
will complement –along with income-the quantitative evaluation. Although it seems 
clear that infant mortality and life expectancy rates are conceptually different than 
                                                 
14 The original database was presented to the United States Congress in 1937 and was included in the 
report National Income:1929-1935. The project was assigned to Simon Kuznets, who led a working 
group in the Research Department of the Commerce Committee. Prior to and during the first years of 
the Great Depression, information about global economic trends was very fragmented. Those 
responsible for the economic policy of the United States designed their policies using isolated data, 
such as the growth of stock indices, automobile sales, and unreliable indices on industrial productivity 




income (and eventually could contribute to the analysis by compensating for any 
measurement error in the dependent variable), it will be helpful to anticipate if both 
variables add new relevant information before quantitative analysis is performed. 
And, at least preliminarily, it seems to be the case.  
 
Graphs Nº6a through 6d display the simple correlation plots for average 
annual changes in GDP per capita for the period 1980-1995 versus levels in infant 
mortality and life expectancy rates in year1995 at a global scale and only considering 
low-income countries in the sample, respectively15. In all cases, the association 
between economic growth and both variables does not display a clear, defined 
pattern. In fact, simple correlation coefficients are significantly small16. For purposes 
of deepening the evaluation about the links between trade openness and well-being, 
this investigation will use infant mortality and life expectancy rates as complementary 
to income to measure welfare in a broader manner.  
 
 
Section 2: The Use of Policy-Oriented Measures of Trade Openness 
 
 Although tariff rates and NTB’s, relative to conventional trade shares, contain 
more relevant information about trade policy, their calculation poses some challenges. 
In the first case, any tariff measure should resolve the obstacle of aggregating 
                                                 
15 According to World Bank’s classification, low-income countries are those with GDP per capita 
below US$4,000 in PPP terms. By year 2000, 63 countries satisfied that condition. 
16 When considering the whole sample, simple correlation coefficients between in infant mortality and 
life expectancy rates and changes in income levels reach only –0.01 and 0.06, respectively. For low-
income countries, those coefficients remain small (-0.03 and –0.12). The study performed the same 





different rates across goods. Simple averages, import-weighted tariff averages, and 
custom duties as percentage of total imports are among the best known alternative 
solutions to the problem. However, these measures show some shortcomings. Simple 
average tariff, on one hand, underestimates (or overestimates) the importance of 
certain tariff lines by assigning all of them the same weight. Conversely, import-
weighted tariffs may result in some inconsistencies: goods facing extremely high 
tariff rates (import value equal to zero) are assigned the same weight as goods subject 
to zero tariff rates. Lastly, custom duties as percentage of total imports miscalculate 
the level of trade protection by incorporating in the denominator the import value of 
commodities (i.e. oil, gas) that, in many countries, are not subject to tariffs but to 
other trade levies such as consumption excise taxes. 
 
 In the case of NTB’s, the aggregation of diverse forms of trade restrictive 
policies (i.e. price controls, automatic licensing, quantity control, subsidies, and 
technical measures) constitutes the main challenge to surpass. Non-tariff coverage 
ratios (the percentage of total tariff lines subject to NTB’s), although widely used, 
have the limitations of leaving aside differences in the severity of such policies and 
not taking into account the number of different types of NTB’s imposed on each 
good.  
 
 Fortunately, a recent work by Kee, Nicita and Olarreaga (2005) makes a 
valuable contribution to overcome aggregation problems in both tariff rates and 




restrictive policy instrument, which combined totalize the level of protection each 
country imposes on imports. Regarding taxes on imports, the authors calculate a 
Tariff Trade Restrictiveness Index, a weighted sum of protection levels built from 
tariff rates and import level data but also from the elasticities of demand for imports. 
By taking into account the sensibility of import values before changes in tariff levels, 
the approach goes beyond the conventional methodology used in the calculation of 
import-weighted tariff rates and reduces the possibility of trade protection 
underestimation. The index is expressed as an equivalent uniform tariff. Cross-
country protection at the tariff level shows significant variation, ranging from 11% 
(OECD members) to 47% (most Sub-Saharan African countries). 
 
 
The study also addresses the difficulty of summing up diverse forms of non-
tariff measures, including agricultural domestic support in the form of subsidies, by 
estimating an Ad-Valorem Equivalent (AVE) for NTB’s comparable to a tariff. The 
exercise consists of two steps. First, the quantity-impact of all NTB’s on imports is 
calculated by predicting import values using country-specific characteristics (i.e. 
factor endowments such as land, capital and labor availability) and observing the 
deviations reported on imports in the presence of NTB’s in the equation. As second 
step, the quantity effect is transformed into a price effect by using the import demand 
curve and the already available elasticity of demand for imports. Data report that 
trade protection of core non-tariff measures varies considerably, from ad-valorem 0% 
to 42%. AVE’s of agricultural domestic support, on the other hand, go from 0% to 
0.2% (which does not necessarily reveals low levels of protection in that sector but a 




of agricultural domestic support are imposed by OECD countries. According to 
simple correlation analysis, higher levels of trade protection from core NTB’s seems 
to be associated with higher average incomes (Graph Nº 7a). This pattern is stronger 
when the relationship between agricultural domestic support and GDP per capita is 
under scrutiny (Graph 7b).  
 
Combined, both the Tariff Trade Restrictiveness Index and the AVE’s for all 
NTB’s (including agricultural domestic support) yield to two overall measures of 
trade openness: the Overall Trade Restrictiveness Index (OTRI), which measures the 
total level of protection imposed by a country on imports; and the Market Access 
Trade Restriction Index (MAOTRI), an overall equivalent uniform tariff rate faced by 
exporters of each country in the rest of the world, built as a mirror of the first one. 
Since trade restrictions imposed by each country on imports are mainly influenced by 
domestic trade policy, this study will label OTRI as a measure of Unilateral Trade 
Openness. By the same token, given that most of international market access granted 
to each country’s exports is the result of multilateral, regional and bilateral trade 
negotiations, MAOTRI will be used as a proxy of Multilateral Trade Openness. For 
both indexes, higher values are associated with higher trade restrictions and less 
market access, respectively. Data is available for 91 countries around year 2000.  
 
Graph 7d displays the relationship between average income and Unilateral 
Trade Openness at a global scale. Even though trade restrictions from non-tariff 




Nº7c) results in a negative association between total trade protection levels and GDP 
per capita. On the other hand, trade restrictions faced by countries (Multilateral Trade 
Openness) are also inversely proportional to their average income. Exports from low-
income countries face the highest trade barriers (a 20% equivalent tariff) in 
international markets, followed by middle (15%) and high-income economies (14%). 
(Graph Nº 8a). Simple correlation analysis supports the notion that poorer countries 
face higher market access restrictions and also reveals that country-income group 
averages are not driven by particular cases (Graph Nº 8b). 
 
However, a point must be highlighted. Although poor countries face the most 
severe trade barriers in terms of tariff rates and NTB’s, at the same time they impose 
the highest trade restrictions to the rest of the world. In net terms, low and middle-
income countries impose to the rest of the world a 4% and 7% equivalent tariff, 
respectively (Graph Nº 8a). The picture, nonetheless, changes when sector-by-sector 
analysis is performed. In agriculture, where developing economies enjoy competitive 
advantages, the situation is the inverse. Exports from low and middle-income 
countries confront the highest restrictions to enter international markets even when 
they impose the lowest trade barriers to agricultural products shipped from trading 
partners (Graph 8c). Now rich countries are those imposing a net trade protection 
equivalent to a 4% tariff rate to the rest of the world. This evidence supports 
developing countries’ foreign trade policy standpoint: those supposed to be the 
primary “winners” in a context of free trade are bearing most of the costs derived 




they display high levels of competence (i.e. the agriculture) remain relatively closed. 
The observed lower market access trade restrictions faced by low-income for 
agricultural goods relative to middle-income countries (39% vs. 43%, respectively) 
may be explained by the proliferation of preferential trade agreements granted by the 
United States and the EU to the least developed economies. Lower levels of 
protection conceded to favored poor nations in the agricultural sector may also 
account for the undefined pattern observed between level of trade restrictions and 
GDP per capita in regression analysis (Graph 7d). 
 
Section 3: Taking Conditionality Seriously 
 
In the Heckscher-Ohlin theoretical framework where free trade is presented as 
a win-win game, internal factors affecting bilateral trade are considered equal across 
borders. Countries engaged in free trade are presumed to possess similar social, 
economic and political domestic conditions capable of securing the free movement of 
factors of production (i.e. capital, labor and technology change) toward competitive 
sectors to achieve efficiency that ultimately leads to specialization and wage 
convergence.  
 
However, these assumptions clash with reality. At the national level, 
asymmetries in stocks of human and physical capital, technological innovation, 
institutional and regulatory frameworks, geographical conditions, and in the degree of 




and producers in the formal market- are huge across different societies, although they 
could make a difference in an environment dominated by global competition. When 
addressing the impact of trade integration on well-being, this study accounts for all 
these factors, as far as data is available. In other words, the research tests the 
hypothesis that maybe free trade has the potential to unleash positive economic and 
social benefits only if certain conditions, within and outside the reach of national 
governments, are in place.  
 
 
Subsection 1: The Conditions 
 
What are those conditions? The classification of the internal factors 
influencing the relationship between trade openness and well-being has been inspired 
by the nature of the expectations national governments and individuals in general 
have about globalization and free trade. As mentioned earlier, free trade policies have 
been politically embraced worldwide because not only they were conceived as a win-
win solution towards global growth –with particular emphasis in keeping developing 
nations in track- but also to help poor countries to get their populations at the bottom 
of the social and economic pyramid out of poverty through a less unequal distribution 
of the benefits created by economic expansion.  
 
In this sense, three “clubs” of internal conditions with the potential of shaping 
the impact of trade integration on well-being have been differentiated. The first group 
is integrated by internal conditions with probed major impact on economic growth 




business competitiveness and market efficiency such as public infrastructure, 
financial depth, stock of human capital, level of technological development, the rule 
of law, and the protection of property rights. The potential impact of opening up the 
economy on average living standards could vary significantly depending on the 
magnitude of cross-the-border differences in factor productivity, transaction costs, 
and overall country-risk. For instance, a good example to show how inadequate 
domestic conditions linked to business competitiveness can offset or restrain the 
possibilities offered by trade liberalization consists in examining the differential 
between the cost faced by some developing countries to access international markets 
versus the cost of shipping their merchandise to the same destination. On average, 32 
Latin American countries face a 2% tariff to enter the U.S. market; however, they pay 
freight costs as percentage of total merchandise for 8.3%, when the world average 
only reaches 5.2% without controlling by geographical distance (U.S. Census Bureau, 
Department of Commerce, 2000). For many Latin American countries the main 
obstacle to gain access to the U.S. market is not longer the tariff, but the transport 
cost (IDB, 2001). 
 
Variables believed to favor a more equal distribution of wealth and 
opportunities for well-being composed the second club. By nature, this type of 
internal factors facilitates the inclusion of individuals -as citizens in the political arena 
and as consumer-producer agents in formal markets- by providing them with rights, 
resources and capabilities to take advantage of new opportunities. Among them stand 




Democracy, even in its more incipient versions, secures a minimum exercise of 
checks and balances within the government branches. This feature, combined to basic 
political rights as free speech and the independence of the press, allows most of the 
government actions and policies to be scrutinized and the demands of the population 
to be heard. In this setting, rent seeking practices and economic and social policies 
favoring exclusive groups of society are censored and limited in comparison to other 
political frameworks. As Sen (1994) asserts, no famine has occurred in a democracy, 
and particularly, in a society enjoying free press. For example, one of the single most 
relevant factors that determine how inclusive a democracy is in procuring its 
members relatively acceptable chances to engage in society and take advantage of 
new prospects offered by trade integration is citizen identity (IDB, 2006). From a 
social point of view, undocumented citizens cannot access most social services (they 
may not be detected, or the identification card or birth certificate is a requisite 
document), enroll in school, or even marry. From an economic perspective, they are 
not able to open a bank account, apply for credit, open a business, or register 
property, necessary requirements to successfully take advantage of the opportunities 
generated by free trade. According to UNICEF (2006), 30% of total births are 
unregistered worldwide every year; Sub Saharan Africa is at the top of the list with 
70%, followed by South Asia (63%), Middle East (30%), and Latin America (15%). 
In some areas of Bolivia, 90% of the population lacked a valid form of identification, 





All factors contained in the first two “clubs” are susceptible to change in the 
presence of active policymaking. National governments, with narrow or broad 
margins, could make a difference in the short, medium or large run if politically 
engaged on these reforms. However, there is a vector of factors imposed by destiny 
and history with significant potential to shape the effects of trade integration on 
human progress. These initial conditions, rigid to vary over time, have recently 
gained more attention as important determinants of economic and social 
development. This third “club” is composed by geography (i.e. distance to 
international markets, disease prevalence), ethnic diversity, and structural inequality.  
 
The possibility of a conditional relationship between free trade and well-being 
appears to hold when descriptive data analysis is performed. Graphs Nº 9, 10 and 11 
exhibit simple correlation plots between the HDI and the two preferred measures of 
trade openness, the Unilateral and the Multilateral Trade Openness indexes17. Both 
are presented for two sets of countries: the top and the bottom 33% of the world 
sample for six variables, two from each “club” of the proposed internal factors. 
Concerning the variables associated with business competitiveness and market 
efficiency (the first “Club”), the slope of the regression line for the “top achievers” –
in terms of public infrastructure and institutional quality- is more pronounced than 
that observed for the “low-achieving countries”, for both measures of trade openness 
(Graph Nº9a through 9h). Human development and trade liberalization are not even 
correlated in economies with modest advances in areas with crucial impact on 
                                                 
17 Only for purposes of focusing and simplifying the analysis in this section, the HDI was chosen as 
proxy of well-being since the index comprises information from different measures of welfare: income 




business competitiveness (Graph Nº 9b, 9f, 9h). These preliminary findings suggest 
that the association between trade openness –whatever measure of trade integration 
used- and well-being holds (or become stronger) only if certain levels of 
complementary policies have been undertaken. 
 
Ethnically less diverse and less unequal societies appear to experience higher 
gains in human development in a context of one-way or two-way-street trade 
liberalization, (Graph Nº11a through 11h). In most cases, ethnic plurality and 
structural income inequality operate as proxies of the distribution of overall 
opportunities (social, economic and political) and the degree of inclusiveness of the 
population as citizens into society and as consumer-producer agents in formal 
markets. Rey de Marulanda and Guzman (2003) summarize the channels through 
which, according to the literature, structural inequality may be associated with human 
development: market development, access to credit, and the medium voter 
preferences. First, in relatively less unequal societies, a strong middle class emerges 
forging a broad domestic demand for goods and services, resulting in a dynamic 
productive apparatus that, over the time, enjoys economies of scale and becomes 
highly specialized. Also, under this scenario local and national authorities participate 
more actively in the provision of public goods. In fact, public investment becomes 
more socially profitable, particularly in the transport and communication sectors, 
since the beneficiaries constitute the majority of the population. Second, when 
imperfections in the credit system arise, observed inequities in the distribution of 




single most important factor to access credit is the ownership of a collateral and 
human capital investment is indivisible, then quality education is only restricted to the 
wealthy. Over generations, the gap in skills deepens in the long term. Finally, the 
third channel relies on the “median voter theorem”, according to which structural 
inequity shapes the political process. This determines, in turn, the pattern of 
development of society. Assuming different initial factor endowments among citizens 
(capital and labor), a scenario dominated by great inequity lead to the allocation of 
fewer units of capital to the median voter. Consequently, strong political pressures 
from the electorate in favor of redistributive and tax policies emerge on the scene, 
damaging long-term investment and growth prospects. 
 
Democracy, measured by the Polity Score, reports less consistent results. 
When testing the association between one-way-street trade integration and well-
being, more democratic societies show higher gains in human development, as 
expected. However, results using multilateral trade openness go in the opposite 
direction: fragile democracies seem to benefit the most from free trade! The 
complexity and aggregate nature of the Polity Score may be behind these results. The 
index captures information from many dimensions intrinsic to political regimes, some 
of them involving very fuzzy concepts (Davis, 2005)18. Given the fact that the 
exercise of basic democratic rights as free speech, free association, and independent 
                                                 
18 The Polity Score results from the summation of two sub-indexes, the democratic and autocratic 
scores, both of them with values ranging from 0 to 10 and 0 to –10, respectively. Each of those 
indexes, in turn, are built based on perceptions from five different political regime dimensions: 
competitiveness of executive recruitment, openness of executive recruitment, constraints on chief 
executive, regulation of participation, and competitiveness of participation. According to Spiro (2005), 
the complexity in the construction of the Polity Score yield odd results: France “is not considered as 
democratic after 1981, but El Salvador is; and Belgium was not a democracy until 1956, but for 1946 




press are considered in this study as the most important channels through which 
democracy may unleash the potentialities of trade openness for human development, 
the Freedom House Political Rights Index, a variable that captures much more 
specific information, constitute a more adequate choice. Now, preliminary results 
from simple correlation analysis appear as expected. The association between trade 
integration (unilateral and multilateral) and well-being is more pronounced in 
societies where the practice of basic political rights is more expanded (Graphs Nº 10c 













Chapter 5: Methods to be Employed: Quantitative Strategy 
 
As mentioned earlier, this investigation proposes the exploration of the 
potentialities of trade integration for well-being by adding three innovative 
components with respect to the existing literature. First, the use of broader and 
alternative measures of welfare to complement the analysis (particularly infant 
mortality rates, and life expectancy). The vast majority of studies has focused 
exclusively on the impact of trade openness on GDP related indicators, such as 
economic growth or income per capita levels, a linked but different exercise. Second, 
the use of policy-oriented indicators to measure overall trade openness, built with 
information from tariff rates, NTB’s, and trade-restraining subsidies (including those 
adopted in the agricultural sector). The new data set allows testing the impact of two 
different measures of trade integration on well-being: unilateral trade openness (trade 
restrictions imposed by each country on imports, which are mainly influenced by 
domestic trade policy) and multilateral trade openness (trade restrictions faced by 
each country’s exports, also a good proxy of each country’s international market 
access, largely the result of dual and multiparty negotiations). Instead, conventional 
literature on the field has employed proxies of trade protection -mostly quantifying 
trade outcomes-, which contain significant measurement errors. Third, the search for 
a possible contingent or conditional relationship between free trade and well-being, 
which has not been a priority in the agenda of mainstream literature despite the fact 
that trade theory has long recognized that possibility. The stock of related research 




association between trade openness and average income, but it has not considered the 
possibility of a conditional connection between both variables. In other words, this 
investigation tests the hypothesis that maybe trade integration has the potential to 
unleash positive economic and social benefits only if certain conditions, within and 
outside the reach of national governments, are in place. 
 
Section 1: The Quantitative Approach 
 
Table Nº 1 summarizes the main features of the quantitative approach to be 
used. In total, the study uses two regression analysis settings (time-series and 
transversal cross-country), three measures of well-being (average income per capita, 
infant mortality rates, and life expectancy), five proxies of trade openness, and 32 
control variables that, according to conventional literature, have an influence on 
welfare standards. Among those related to trade are: PPP-adjusted trade shares, 
calculated as the summation of total imports and exports relative to GDP expressed in 
purchasing power parity terms; predicted trade shares based on a gravitational model 
using geographical variables as calculated in Frank and Romer (1999); average tariff 
rates, defined as total tariff revenues as share of total imports; unilateral trade 
openness, the overall trade restrictiveness index, which measures the overall 
equivalent ad valorem tariff rate imposed by each country on imports; and the 
multilateral trade openness, the overall market access index that measures the overall 




world19. The last two variables, built with information from tariff rates, NTB’s, and 
trade-restraining subsidies (including those adopted in the agricultural sector), are 
taken from Kee, Nicita, and Olarreaga (2005). All variables have been included in 
both panel and cross-country analysis settings based on data availability. Although 
life expectancy is accessible for panel regression analysis, its significant low 
variability over-time make difficult to obtain consistent inferences across the selected 
model specifications.  
 
Regarding the use of control variables, just five (public infrastructure, 
domestic credit, education achievement, macroeconomic stability, and democracy) 
cover the span of time required by panel regression analysis (1980-2000). The rest of 
them (27), which capture new developed, original, and relevant information for the 
purpose of this investigation, is only susceptible to be included in cross-country 
analysis. In this setting, to avoid multicollinearity problems when regression analysis 
is performed (some controls are correlated among them) and at the same time to take 
full advantage of the information captured by them, factor analysis is employed on 
three conceptually different groups of control variables (or “Clubs”) believed to 
significantly influence well-being through different channels in a context of 
progressive trade integration20. Before factoring, the variables were carefully grouped 
                                                 
19 Following Frank and Romer (1999), predicted trade shares are the result of a gravitational model 
where bilateral trade shares are regressed against a set of mainly geographical variables such as land 
area, bilateral distance, share border and landlocked indicators, population, and common language. The 
variable has passed the “American Economic Review” test, and since then, has been widely used as an 
outcome-oriented trade openness indicator in the existing literature. 
20 Factor analysis is used to find latent variables or factors among observed variables. In the presence 
of multiple variables and the increasing possibility of multicollinearity, it can be used to reduce their 
number based on shared similar characteristics. The resulting factors, which can be incorporated in 




in these “Clubs” according to their intrinsic conditions to influence (1) economic 
growth, and (2) the distribution of the benefits generated by markets. A third group 
was composed by (3) conditions imposed by destiny and history -all of them found to 
be associated to structural inequality - with significant potential to shape the effects of 
trade integration on human progress. Annex Nº 1 describes the data in more detail. 
The principal factor components resulted from factor analysis, which now shows 
acceptable levels of correlation for regression analysis, have been labeled as Business 
Competitiveness and Market Efficiency (Club 1), Democracy (Club 2), and Structural 
Inequality (Club 3)21.  
 
The reason why factor analysis was not carried out to obtain a principal factor 
component for the second “Club” is straightforward. Even though several indicators 
measuring democratic values have been developed in recent years, the vast majority 
of them still suffer from cross-country sample size limitations22. This constraint 
leaves the investigation with two options, the Polity Score and the Freedom House 
Political Rights Index, both available for 152 and 187 countries for year 2000, 
respectively. Nonetheless, preliminary regression analysis showed in chapter four and 
extensive literature in the field (Spiro, 1994; Davis, 2005) suggest that the Polity 
                                                 
21 Factor analysis was heavily facilitated by the fact that the initial grouping of variables –based on 
theoretical criteria, in order words, based on how well every variable fitted the conceptual definition of 
each “Club” – matched the second grouping of variables, based on how statistically correlated they 
were with respect to each other. Simple correlation coefficient among controls variables and those 
resulting from principal factor components are shown in Annex Nº 2. This finding supports the 
argument that, conceptually and statistically, the three groups of variables contain relevant but 
different information, and they may have an effect on well-being through different channels. 
22 More than twenty different indicators measuring multiple dimensions of democracy have been 
constructed in the last five years, at regional and global scale. However, sample size ranges from 20 to 
70 observations. The Inter American Development Bank (IADB)’s governance database, DataGob, has 




Score may be too aggregated and also captures information from many dimensions of 
political regimes, some of them involving very fuzzy concepts. In addition, since the 
central goal of factor analysis is computing the commonalities of correlated variables, 
the essential procedures of this quantitative tool find completely useless the 
incorporation of two variables where, conceptually, the first encompasses all the 
information contained in the second one, which appears to be case. Given the fact that 
the exercise of basic democratic rights as free speech, free association, and 
independent press are considered in this study as the most important channels through 
which democracy may unleash the potentialities of trade openness for human 
development (for reasons already sustained), the Freedom House Political Rights 
Index, a variable that captures much more specific information about those singular 
democratic practices, constitute a more adequate choice. 
  
A couple of precisions regarding the last group of variables. Although in 
principle the four variables contained in “Club 3” denotes cross-country geographical 
aspects, all of them have been intimately linked in the existing literature to structural 
inequality. In fact, the Index of Malaria Risk Transmission may not only capture the 
direct effects of land and labor productivity and transport costs on income as stated by 
Sachs (2003), but also is a good proxy for persistent social exclusion and inequality. 
Engerman and Sokoloff (1997) elaborate the thesis that former colonies 
geographically located in tropical areas –where coincidentally malaria disease 
incidence is the highest- developed over time social structures relatively more 




(coffee, sugar, cotton) need abundant and cheap labor to achieve economies of scale 
to become profitable. In the former colonies, that restriction was relatively easy to 
solve through the use of slave labor force and the exploitation of indigenous 
communities. Over time, and even after the independence, these societies evolved 
fragmented and exclusive. Other two variables, Ethnic Fragmentation Index and 
Distance to the Equator, seem to capture similar information (La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998). The average income Gini coefficient for the 
period 1980-2000 is, in itself, a good proxy of structural inequality (Deininger and 
Squire, 2001).  
 
Lastly, it is important to discuss up front a potential methodological problem 
when including policy-oriented trade openness measures in the right side of the 
equation. Theory suggests a possible endogenous relationship between trade 
protection and income (or eventually alternative proxies of well-being): trade 
liberalization may lead to higher income, but progressive industrialization may also 
encourage further reductions in trade barriers. Nonetheless, this study sustains that the 
presence of double causality in this particular case lacks of strong empirical evidence. 
Although it seems the case for most OECD countries, tariff liberalization in the 
developing world has been predominantly influenced by exogenous waves of 
structural reforms rather than the endogenous consequences of industrialization 
processes. As previously mentioned, local and global political economy played a 
crucial role in dismantling trade barriers in emerging economies through 




of centrally-planned economies. Contrary to the endogeneity presumption stands the 
fact that much of the trade liberalization reform in the developing world was carried 
out when the worst economic shock affecting those economies –the debt crisis of the 
eighties- was on its highest point. From all 73 developing countries undergone 
unilateral trade reforms since 1975, 63% undertook such reforms in the beginning of 
the nineties (Wacziarg and Welch, 2003). Previously displayed data also seem to tell 
a different story. Even though per capita income is negatively correlated with tariff 
levels (Graph Nº 7c), the association between the former and trade protection from 
core NTB’s and from agricultural domestic support policies is exactly the inverse 
(Graphs Nº 7a and 7b). In other words, maybe countries embark on further tariff rate 
reductions as they industrialize and become richer, but it is not the case for other 
important types of trade restrictive policies such as non-trade barriers and 
governmental support to specific sectors. In fact, when OECD members are excluded 
from the sample (from Graph Nº 7d), the statistical significance of the displayed 
negative correlation between the overall trade openness index and per capita income 
evaporates. 
 
An additional potential source of endogeneity comes from the relationship 
between institutional quality (which is partially contained in “Club 1”) and average 
income. If good institutions foster economic growth, then it is plausible that 
progressive richer societies will be keen to promote further improvements on 
economic and social institutions. The issue is widely discussed in La Porta, Lopez-de-




Rodrik, Subramanian, and Trebbi (2002). Although the presence of endogeneity 
between “Club 1” (the principal factor component from 27 different variables, in 
which the rule of law is the only variable containing information about institutional 
quality) and average GDP per capita could be challenged, this investigation will 
include results from regression analysis using settlement mortality rates as instrument 
for “Club 1”, the Business Competitiveness and Market Efficiency factor component, 
when regressed against income per capita and life expectancy rates. This study 
expects to find no significant changes in such results in comparison to those reported 
by OLS regression analysis 23. 
 
 
Section 2: A “Building Block” Strategy 
 
The quantitative approach follows a “building block” strategy. As analytical 
starting point, literature-driven model specifications and conventional data used to 
gauge the impact of trade openness on well-being are tested to replicate the standard 
experiment, using fixed-effects panel regression analysis for the period 1980-2000. 
As second step, and building on the results from the time-series framework, 
conventional measures of trade openness are interacted with the five available 
internal complementary conditions, in search of evidence of a possible conditional 
association between trade integration and indicators of quality of life. Results are 
                                                 
23 Settlement mortality rates were taken from Phillip Curtin (1989, 1998) and are available for 64 
countries. According to Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001), the institutional building process 
experienced in the former colonies was mainly influenced by the feasibility of developing settlements 
of newcomers after the European conquest. In turn –they argue-, the probability of settlement 
expansion was mostly affected by geographic conditions such as the incidence of tropical diseases. In 
places with low tropical disease prevalence, European-style institutions were reproduced; in territories 




contrasted with those found by Chang, Kaltani and Loayza (2005), who performed 
very similar experiments. By this point, aside from adding infant mortality rates as an 
alterative measure of well-being, the quantitative work is just reproducing existing 
efforts and contrasting results. Once this benchmark analysis is done, the study moves 
to cross-country analysis, where most of the original contribution is done, by 
progressively adding more relevant, newly developed data. Now, using OLS 
regression analysis in a proposed model specification that incorporates the factors 
labeled Business Competitiveness and Market Efficiency, Democracy, and Structural 
Inequality as control variables, the study first compare findings when both standard -
outcome-oriented proxies of trade openness (trade shares)- and the preferred -policy-
oriented measures of trade liberalization- are included separately as main explanatory 
variables. Then, it includes simultaneously the four trade openness measures to 
evaluate the robustness of each one. Results are also contrasted when income per 
capita and life expectancy are incorporated separately as indicators of quality of life. 
Finally, in the same transversal cross-country arrangement, the three “Clubs” of 
internal conditions are interacted with the favorite trade liberalization indexes -
unilateral and multilateral trade openness- in search of a conditional association 
between trade policy and well-being.  
 
Section 3: What to Expect from Panel Regression Analysis? 
 
As showed by conventional literature on the field, the study expects to find a 




the same sources, these results would receive quite different interpretations. 
Trade shares, being a poor proxy for trade integration (it denotes trade outcomes, not 
policies), may enter the equation as statistically significant because they contain lots 
of information from complementary policies affecting economic growth, 
geographical variables, and demographic conditions (i.e. population density). This 
effect could be amplified by the fact of having very few controls in the equation. 
They also may reflect the impact of international economic cycles in countries highly 
dependent on export-oriented commodities, since changes on sales overseas are 
significantly sensitive to variations in international commodity prices, as experienced 
over the past two decades (Birdsall and Hamoudi, 2002). 
 
As for predicted trade shares based on geographical data, the investigation 
anticipates significant although sign-inverted coefficients. Since this outcome-
oriented trade indicator comprises significant geographical information, and the latter, 
in turn, is intimately associated with structural inequality, it should not come to a 
surprise if the mentioned proxy of trade openness reports a negative and strong 
relationship with well-being along different model specifications, as demonstrated by 
evidence found in the literature on income and inequality. Joining efforts in search for 
the same explanation, Rodrik (2002) identifies public health and institutional quality 
as additional channels through which trade –measured with data on geography- can 
affect income, negatively. Once again, this anticipated effect could be amplified in 
panel regression analysis due to the inexistence of a variable in the equation 




though a better approximation to trade integration since they contain some 
information about policy, are expected to be sensible across model specifications 
because they do not encapsulate evidence from the other important sources regarding 
trade restraining policies such as NTB’s and subsidies, which paradoxically are 
considered in the actual debate about trade integration and development as 
determinant in explaining cross-country differences in trade protection levels.  
  
With respect to control variables such as public infrastructure, domestic 
credit, education achievement, and macroeconomic stability, they are expected 
to enter the equation with strong, robust, and significant coefficients when 
regressed against income, supporting the vast evidence presented by the 
literature on economic growth. Nonetheless, there is a high probability that some of 
them with no clear impact on income distributive patterns could appear not significant 
in explaining differences on welfare indicators that change on the margin, such as 
infant mortality rates. Domestic credit (measured as total credit directed to the private 
sector relative to GDP) is a good candidate to be dominated by this effect. In fact, 
public infrastructure (through better physical access to markets and social services), 
education (more and better job opportunities), and macroeconomic stability 
(improved purchasing power) could have a more direct impact on welfare distribution 
arrangements than that predicted from private credit, whose effects depend on a series 
of assumptions, such as the type of allocation of the financial resources and their 
productivity. Finally, democracy -because of the aggregate nature and complexity of 





In the time-series framework, the investigation foresees to find evidence of a 
conditional relationship between trade openness and well-being. Since both 
conventional trade openness indicators and control variables are expected to register 
strong and significant coefficients in the original model specification, then trade-
based interaction variables are also supposed to report explanatory power when 
regressed against indicators of living standards. Once again, these results may be 
contaminated by severe measurement errors contained in the main independent 
variables as well as by the limited relevant information contained in few control 
variables.  
 
Because of data restrictions imposed by the particularities and innovations of 
the proposed hypothesis, cross-country regression analysis becomes the best 
quantitative approach to address the research question. The policy-oriented overall 
measures of trade integration, which are supposed to correct the severe measurement 
errors presented in conventional proxies of trade openness used in panel regression 
analysis, are only available for one point in time, around year 2000. The study faces 
similar limitations regarding the inclusion of new developed and relevant control 
variables in the model (encompassed in the three “Clubs” of internal conditions), 
additional data that feed and improve the time-series setting by incorporating new and 
broader information from multidimensional policy areas and structural country-





Section 4: Then, What to Expect from Cross-Country Regression Analysis 
 
First, regressed against income and now controlled by much more 
relevant information, both conventional trade shares should appear not 
significant, supporting one of the study’s main points. This result should be 
conclusive if the statistical irrelevance of both measures persists in the presence of all 
other trade openness indicators in the same equation. For their part, the three 
“Clubs” of internal conditions are expected to report strong, robust, and 
significant coefficients. When replacing income by life expectancy as indicator of 
quality of life, two notorious changes should occur. On one hand, it is likely that PPP-
adjusted and predicted trade shares –as shown in extensive literature- explain life 
expectancy. However, as this investigation defends, it is highly plausible that the 
resulted strong association between both variables may not reflect the virtues of trade 
in terms of human progress, but those of technology and information transmission –
highly correlated with trade shares- on health status (Deaton, 2004). On the other 
hand, the cluster of variables comprising information from growth-driven factors (the 
first “Club”) may not enter significantly in the equation because they are well fitted to 
explain cumulative measures of well-being (income) but not necessarily distributional 
ones (life expectancy) 24. 
  
With respect to the unilateral and multilateral trade openness indexes, 
the investigation expects to find the first not significantly associated with well-
                                                 
24 Guzman (2006), testing the importance of institutions, trade openness, and geography on well-being, finds very 




being, but the second strong and highly related, across diverse model 
specifications before interacting it with complementary internal conditions. Trade 
theory and evidence found from General Equilibrium Models (GEM), an 
econometric-alternative tool used to address the impact of trade liberalization on 
welfare, could be very informative to understand what to expect from the coefficients 
of the preferred measures of trade integration, the unilateral and the multilateral trade 
openness indexes25. According to theory, trade liberalization may impact household’s 
income through three channels: changes in prices of consumption goods (via 
domestic tariff reductions), changes in tax burden or subsidy systems across socio-
economic segments of the population (through eventual changes in tax policy caused 
by losses in import duties or the creation of safety nets to cushion the effects of 
external shocks), and changes in labor market conditions (the net outcome from the 
creation and the destruction of jobs as consequence of deviations in relative trade 
protection levels across productive sectors) (McCulloch, Winters, and Cirera, 2006; 
Bussolo and Round, 2004; Vos, Taylor, and Paes de Barros, 2002). Nonetheless, 
based on results from GEM’s that quantitatively evaluate the relative importance of 
those channels in transmitting the effects of tariff reductions on household’s incomes, 
the third channel –changes in labor markets- has been, by far, the most important 
(Hertel, Preckel, and Reimer, 2001; Hertel, Ivanic, Preckel, Cranfield, and Martin, 
                                                 
25 General Equilibrium Models (GEM) are quantitative models that simulate the real dynamics of the 
economy. In their design, they incorporate complex interrelations among sectors and agents in the 
economy such as firms, families, and the government. GEM models are now widely used to assess the 
impact of policy reforms across sectors and household’s welfare in countries, regions, and even the 





2003; Ganuza, Morley, Robinson, Vos, 2005; Bussolo and Lay, 2003; Bussolo and 
Mensbrugghe, 2006).  
 
Based on these two pieces of information, multilateral trade openness has 
more chances to appear significantly associated to welfare indicators because it has 
the potential to account for very significant changes on the demand for employment 
by tracking gains (or losses) in global market access. For its part, one-sided trade 
liberalization alone, through the dynamics of its three transmission channels, could 
result in a zero-sum game in terms of general welfare, since at these stances trade 
policy is more dominated by its distributive rather than income-generating forces. In 
fact, adjustments in relative internal prices favoring the urban consumer-oriented 
household used to do so at the expense of small rural producers, and vice versa; the 
funding of pro-poor safety nets tends to hurt the disposable income of middle class 
families via a grater tax burden to formal employees; the reduction in the tariff of 
inputs benefits local industries specialized in the production of consumer goods but 
hurts infant manufactures operating along the production chain. Moreover, internal 
labor movements (controlling by any change in cross-the-border market conditions), 
may result in either increases or reductions in total employment depending on the 
labor-intensiveness of the favored sectors. 
 
 Regarding the fundamental question of the investigation, a conditional 
relationship between trade openness and well-being is expected to hold in cross-




the study anticipates that multilateral trade openness (trade restrictions faced by 
each country’s exports, also a good proxy of each country’s international market 
access, largely the result of dual and multiparty negotiations) will show significant 
explanatory power over indicators of quality of life only if some internal 
conditions or complementarities (captured in the three “Clubs”) are fulfilled. 
This result implies finding strong and significant coefficients for the trade-based 
interaction variables, but weak ones for those corresponding to the trade 
openness index alone in the same equation. This finding would go hand in hand 
with the main argument sustained by this study, which has permanently pointed out 
that according to trade theory and empirical evidence found in econometric-
alternative tools, the effect of trade liberalization on welfare (particularly on income) 
depends on diverse assumptions and policy complementarities. 
 
More precisely, how the additional demand for employment generated by 
gains in international market access translate into actual job opportunities and/or 
higher real wages depends on multiple factors beyond trade policy such as labor 
flexibility, human capital accumulation, the degree of within-industry competition, 
the size of the informal sector, and the true shape of the labor supply curve, just to 
cite a few. First, the degree of labor mobility or the flexibility enjoyed by workers in 
moving towards trade-induced expanding sectors may determine the magnitude of 
beneficiary households. Second, gains through increases in household’s wages also 
depend on their relative skills to perform successfully and become more productive in 




along the production chain in the export-oriented sectors affects both price 
transmission and productivity gains. On one hand, reductions in prices of goods 
resulting from tariff liberalization would hardly benefit final consumers (households, 
enterprises) if market power were exerted at critical stages of the 
production/distribution process, capturing price-induced gains. On the other hand, 
market dominance may severely restrict the entry and exit of firms –and therefore 
hurting prospects for market efficiency- if used to restrict access to networks, to 
encourage exclusive dealing and refusal-to-deal practices (UNCTAD, 1999). Finally, 
the size of the informal sector and the initial level of employment –which influence 
the true shape of the labor supply curve- may determine if the eventual sectoral 
expansionary forces from free trade translate into either more jobs with unvarying 






Chapter 6: Results 
 
Section 1: Panel Regression Analysis 
 
 Table Nº 2 summarizes the results from fixed-effects panel regression analysis 
for the period 1980-2000, using conventional data found in existing works addressing 
the impact of trade openness on well-being, measured by income per capita and infant 
mortality rates. Separately, the three different proxies for trade integration enter the 
equation strong, highly significant, and showing the expected sign when regressed 
against GDP per capita. As argued, the interpretation of these results, however, differs 
from that stated in standard literature that defends the existence of a direct link 
between trade openness and income levels. First, trade shares may appear significant 
since they capture lots of information from diverse policies and reforms affecting 
economic growth, geographical and demographic variables. Second, predicted trade 
shares built with information from geographical data are, rather than a proxy for trade 
openness, a measure of structural inequality, health status, or institutional quality 
(Sachs, 2003; Rodrik, 2002); therefore, they are supposed to significant and 
negatively affect income, in line with the evidence obtained by most studies in the 
field. Average tariffs, the best available policy-oriented measure for panel regression 
analysis but paradoxically hardly used in this kind of experiment, is strong and 
significantly associated with income, suggesting that higher trade restrictive policies 




more revealing when regressed against infant mortality rates, where no clear pattern 
is found. 
 
As anticipated, public infrastructure, domestic credit, and education 
achievement are highly relevant explanatory variables. Domestic credit is however 
the exemption to the rule in explaining infant mortality rates along all model 
specifications (it appears with inverted sign), complying with the study’s 
expectations, which stated that, in comparison to public infrastructure and education 
achievement, the way through which credit impacts distributional measures of well-
being may be a long and winding road. Interestingly, macroeconomic stability, 
measured as inflation levels, is not significant in any specification, possibly because 
both trade shares are PPP-adjusted variables, and hence also incorporate information 
from changes in consumer price indexes. The Polity Score, the best accessible proxy 
for democracy in the time-series setting, reports inconsistent but expected results 
when using different measures of trade openness, mainly because it contains too 
aggregated information about democratic practices. 
 
Now, when testing a possible conditional association between trade openness 
and well-being, all trade-based interaction variables are highly significant showing 
the expected direction, being democracy the sole anticipated exception (Table Nº 3 
through Nº 7). Most of the coefficients for trade openness are also relevant 
explanatory variables, though they are systematically significant when infant 




regression setting trade openness seems, in general, to have a direct impact on quality 
of life and this effect is enhanced if public infrastructure is more developed, credit is 
available, and the stock of human capital is competitive. The findings are in line with 
those reported by Chang, Kaltani and Loayza (2005), who perform a very similar 
experiment using income as dependent variable and predicted trade shares as sole 
proxy for trade integration26. The authors mainly rely on these results to build a case 
in favor of trade openness as a direct and indirect income-generating factor through 
the fulfillment of complementary policies.  
 
 
Section 2: Cross-Country Regression Analysis 
 
For a variety of reasons, findings from panel regression analysis are not 
sufficient to claim the relevance of trade openness in explaining, direct or 
conditionally, observed cross-country differences in indicators of quality of life. 
Though it was indeed necessary to perform such analysis to replicate what has been 
done in the field as an analytical benchmark, further cross-country regression analysis 
is indispensable to correct for severe measurement errors contained in conventional 
variables used to measured trade openness and to reduce omitted variable problems 
via the inclusion of more relevant and newly developed data sets that covers 
information from multidimensional policy areas and structural country-specific 
conditions beyond growth-driven factors. Furthermore, the access to original data 
                                                 
26 Interestingly, the authors also found significant but negative coefficients for predicted trade shares when 




amplifies the scope of policy areas susceptible to be interacted with trade integration, 
in comparison to what has been done in current available research.  
 
Therefore, the first exercise in cross-country analysis consists of testing the 
significance of conventional measures of trade openness believed to contain 
significant measurement errors once controlling for more relevant information, and 
contrasting the results with those obtained in panel regression analysis. This is done 
in Table Nº 8 (Columns 1 and 2). Now, when regressed against income, trade shares 
are not significant in a model that incorporates more and relevant information than 
that captured by control variables used in panel regression analysis, which is 
comprised in transversal analysis by principal component factors labeled Business 
Competitiveness and Market Efficiency, Democracy, and Structural Inequality from 
27 different variables affecting well-being27. In other words, once information from 
diverse policies affecting economic growth (“Club 1”) and from geography (“Club 
3”) is added, as expected trade shares relative to GDP and predicted trade shares 
becomes insignificant, respectively. The results are confirmed when all four available 
indicators of trade openness are included simultaneously in the equation (Column 4). 
A recurrent finding, from which this investigation also cannot escape, is the strong 
and significant association between trade shares and health status indicators (Table Nº 
8; Column 5, 6 and 7). However, as already discussed, it is highly plausible that the 
resulted strong coefficients may not reflect the virtues of trade in terms of well-being, 
but those of technology and information transmission –highly correlated with trade 
                                                 
27 Average tariffs were not included in cross-country analysis due to sample-size limitations. The 




shares- on health status (Deaton, 2004). The impressive diffusion of information and 
technology used to prevent common illnesses and to improve basic health care 
conditions, usually attributed to globalization but beyond trade policy, seems to have 
played a much more important role. 
 
In turn, the coefficients of the preferred policy-oriented trade openness 
measures (that include information from tariffs, NTB’s and trade-restraining subsidies 
such as those adopted in the agricultural sector) appear with the expected sign and 
level of significance (Columns 3, 4, 7 and 8). On one hand, the unilateral trade 
openness index, which measures the overall equivalent ad valorem tariff rate imposed 
by each country on imports, is not significant across model specifications, supporting 
the idea that one-way trade liberalization alone could result in a zero-sum game in 
terms of general welfare, since at these stances trade policy is more dominated by its 
distributive rather than income-generating forces, which evidence the conflicting 
interests between urban vs. rural households, low vs. middle classes, and local 
producers vs. import-oriented sectors. On the other hand, at first glance the 
coefficient of multilateral trade openness index (overall equivalent ad valorem tariff 
rate faced by each country’s exports in the rest of the world and a proxy of each 
country’s access to international markets) enters negative, strong, robust, and 
significant. As countries face lower access restrictions to international markets, their 
well-being increases. Given that gains in international market access may have a 




may facilitate the achievement of economies of scale, its substantial relevance in 
determining well-being is, at least at this point, justified.  
 
Internal conditions are relevant explanatory variables in determining 
differences in wealth accumulation (Table Nº 8; Columns 1 through 4). The low 
correlation among them and their importance in explaining GDP per capita suggest 
they affect income through different channels. Countries with more competitive firms 
and more efficient markets, and societies where the respect for basic political rights 
such as free speech, free association, and independent press is more expanded, 
achieve greater income levels. For its part, structural inequality hurts general living 
standards. As mentioned, because in most cases structural inequality operates as 
proxy of the distribution of overall opportunities (social, economic and political), it is 
believed to affect negatively well-being through three channels: market development, 
access to credit, and the medium voter preferences. All these anticipated results are 
coherent with evidence registered in existing literature. Similar conclusions can be 
drawn when life expectancy acts as dependent variable, excepting for the coefficients 
of the cluster of variables comprising information from growth-driven factors. As also 
predicted, Business Competitiveness and Market Efficiency is key in determining 
differences in cumulative measures of well-being (income), but not necessarily 
distributional ones (life expectancy) (Guzman, 2006)28. The investigation replied the 
                                                 
28 Guzman (2006) reports that after controlling for competing factors and correcting for endogeneity 
problems, institutional quality shows a robust and strong association with average income; however, 
when the GDP-related indicator is replaced by the life expectancy in the same equation the 
significance of institutions evaporates in all specifications and cedes its hegemony in explaining cross-
country income differences to geographic variables -such as risk of malaria transmission- which is 
believed to contain relevant information about distributional patterns of capabilities and opportunities 




basic model specification using instrumental variables to correct for potential sources 
of endogeneity between well-being and institutional quality, being “Cub 1” the 
instrumented variable. Results do not differ from original findings29. 
 
Table Nº 9 show the regression results when the unilateral trade openness 
index is interacted with the three “Clubs” of internal conditions believed to have a 
significant influence in a context of progressive trade integration. Results confirm that 
one-way-trade liberalization has neither a direct nor a conditional impact on well-
being (measured by average income and life expectancy) even in the presence of 
complementary favorable conditions. Only the interaction term between unilateral 
trade openness and structural inequality is significant when regressed against income, 
which indicates that one-sided reductions in trade protection may lead to a general 
decrease in average living standards in highly unequal countries (Table Nº 9, Column 
4). Interestingly, in theory the interaction of the forces from both variables can 
actually yield such result: because one-sided trade liberalization produces mainly 
redistributive effects on income, in countries where socio-economic assets and 
opportunities are concentrated the “winners” from changes in trade policy are 
probable those possessing major financial and political resources to influence public 
policy. 
 
                                                 
29 See results in Annex Nº 4. Settler mortality rates are used as instrument for “Club 1”. Findings 
resemble those reported in original model specification when regressed against life expectancy rates. 
When average income enters the equation as dependent variable, unilateral trade openness reports 
marginal statistic significance. However, results should be taken cautiously due to a significant drop in 




 Results of cross-country regression analysis including interaction variables 
between multilateral trade openness and control variables are displayed in Table Nº 
10. Now, controlling by relevant interaction variables and contrary to what was found 
in the basic model specification (Table Nº 8, Columns 3 and 7), results show no 
evidence of a direct, unambiguous impact of multilateral trade openness on living 
standards. In short, the access to new markets, alone, does not guarantee neither the 
generation of wealth nor the achievement of improved social indicators when 
controlling by interaction terms. This seems quiet obvious. Even a significant 
enlargement in market size may have no economic or social returns if local producers 
do not posses export capacity and other minimal favorable conditions such as 
adequate technology, public infrastructure, access to credit, a business enabling 
environment, and so on. As also pointed out, even assuring the fulfillment of the 
former conditions, how the additional demand for employment generated by gains in 
international market access translate into actual job opportunities and/or higher real 
wages depends on multiple factors beyond trade policy such as the degree of labor 
mobility across sectors (labor flexibility), the household’s relative skills to move and 
to perform successfully in new market opportunities created by trade integration 
(education), the market structure along the production chain in the export-oriented 
sectors (degree of within-industry competition), the size of the informal sector and the 
initial level of employment (the true shape of the labor supply curve). 
 
 Consistent with that line of thinking, the study finds acceptable evidence of a 




quality of life. In addition, the findings suggest that in a context of trade integration, 
complementary conditions may affect well-being for quite different channels. As 
argued, variables associated with the achievement of business competitiveness and 
market efficiency seem to complement gains in international market access in rising 
cumulative welfare indicators such as average income, but not distributional ones, 
like life expectancy, indicator that changes on the margin (Columns 2 and 6). The 
reason behind this logic is simple: market efficiency assures output maximization, but 
not necessarily equal distribution. On the contrary, the exercise of specific democratic 
practices promotes a better distribution of the benefits created by the access to larger 
markets, but appears to have a not significant role in inducing higher average incomes 
under two-sided trade integration (Columns 3 and 7). And that is because democratic 
regimes, though displaying no clear income-generating forces, as a minimum 
guarantee the respect for some basic values (i.e. free expression, voice, 
accountability), which facilitates the channeling of wide-ranging demands for better 
distribution of resources and opportunities for development.  
 
According to the results from regression analysis, this investigation arrives to 
two conclusions. First, unilateral or one-way-street trade liberalization is not 
associated with higher levels of well-being, showing neither a direct impact nor a 
conditional one in the presence of complementary conditions. Therefore, in the case 
of unilateral trade openness the original hypothesis proposed by this study is rejected. 
Second, gains in international market access do not alone guarantee the achievement 




the presence of favorable internal conditions. Thus, in the case of multilateral trade 
openness, the original hypothesis is accepted.  
 
 
Section 3: South East Asia and Latin America: The Importance of Education and 
Structural Inequality Defining Development Gains from Trade Openness 
 
 
 Latin America and Southeast Asia, in particular those countries characterized 
as “high-performance Asian economies” (HPAE), offer a helpful framework for the 
analysis of the impact of complementary policies on well-being in a context of 
progressive trade openness30. Economic prosperity and social advances made by the 
HPAE and the delay in Latin American advancement were an indisputable reality as 
of the end of the twentieth century. 
  
Several studies give ample statistical and empirical evidence about the 
remarkable patterns of economic growth, accumulation of human capital and 
indicators of well-being registered by the so-called “four Asian tigers” and the newly 
industrialized Asian economies. Table 11 summarizes some of the most import 
human development indicators for six Latin American economies and six high-
performance Asian economies in the 1990s. On average, the standard of living and 
per capita production in the Southeast Asian countries in question are 30% and 80%, 
                                                 
30 The HPAE includes the “four Asian tigers” (Singapore, Republic of Korea, Hong Kong and Taiwan) 




respectively, above what was registered by their Latin American counterparts31. 
When adding high life expectancy and more rapid accumulation of human capital, 
gains in human development are also significant. 
 
 Today those figures do not surprise anyone. What is really surprising is that 
only 40 years ago the situation was exactly the opposite. In fact, in 1960 the quality of 
life of an average Latin American was significantly better than that of an average 
inhabitant of countries that are now high-performance Asian economies. Table 12 
reproduces the human development indicators for similar countries in 1960. The 
wealth generated by the economies of what are now considered part of the “Asian 
miracle”, represented on average barely half of what had been achieved in Latin 
America. With the exception of Hong Kong, none of the HPAE had surpassed the 
economic activity levels of the weakest countries in the Latin American sample, such 
as, for example, Colombia. Likewise, the standard of living in Southeast Asia was, on 
average, 30% lower than what was enjoyed in Latin America. Including the 
population of Indonesia in the calculation, in 1960 life expectancy in Latin America 
was 10 years higher than in the HPAE. In short, four decades ago the levels of human 
development were clearly more favorable for Latin America.  
 
What happened in these 40 years? What did Latin America do or fail to do to 
have such disappointing advances in human development? In 40 years, the average 
                                                 
31 The standard of living, one component of human development, has been calculated on the basis of 
GDP per capita and taking into account the foundation that the level of income can act as an important 
medium or instrument to raise the quality of life (Sen, 1996). The index has been constructed on the 





standard of living of the HPAE more than doubled (1.4 times) and that of Latin 
America had only modest improvement (0.26). While the GDP per capita in 
Southeast Asia nearly quintupled in the same period, the GDP per capita in Latin 
America barely grew by half of its 1960 value. As confirmed by the United Nations, 
in only 40 years the HPAE went from having the lowest advances in human 
development, to being classified as societies with greatest progress in human 
development at the end of the twentieth century. That means the citizens of these 
select economies can enjoy a level of life only surpassed by the populations of the 
member countries of the OECD. 
 
Although different interpretations have been proposed to understand these two 
opposing paths (market-friendly vs. interventionist policies: World Bank, 1995; the 
role of the promotion of industrial, agrarian and social policies: Ranis, 1990; 
Haggard, 1994; Larraín and Vergara, 1993; Balassa, 1988; constructive vs. 
obstructive government interventionism: Dorrnbusch and Edwards, 1990; the effects 
of demographic evolution in economic growth: Williamson, 1993; Coale and Hoover, 
1958), empirical evidence presented by this study could shed light about another 
possible interesting channel: the role played by the initial complementary conditions 
in a context of progressive trade integration in the configuration of the pattern of 
human development. Although the implementation of free trade policies were 
interrupted in Latin America in the seventies by the adoption of the import-




remained very close (see Graph Nº 12), suggesting that openness to international 
trade, alone, may not explain such diverging development patterns.  
 
 However, the fulfillment of some internal complementary conditions to trade 
integration, such as the initial level of human capital accumulation and structural 
inequality, may explain such divergences. Figures included in Table 13 suggest 
interesting interpretations. The “four tigers of Asia” and the “newly industrialized 
Asian economies” were, individually and collectively, significantly more equitable 
with better human capital in contrast with Latin America in 1960. According to the 
Gini indices, not only was income more poorly distributed in Latin America, but the 
level of concentration of land ownership reached spectacular levels32. Malaysia, the 
most unequal society in the Asian region did not even approach the levels of inequity 
seen in the Latin American sample. In conclusion, the most equitable societies in their 
initial phases of development achieved greater advances in human development in a 
context of progressive trade integration.  
 
 The “initial conditions” of human capital and, above all, its potential for future 
decades, were also more favorable in Southeast Asia. In view of the fact that certain 
figures relating to human capital mask reality, it is necessary to analyze theses figures 
with care. In spite of Latin America making notable advances in access to schooling, 
particularly primary school, compared to their Asian counterparts, the Latin American 
education system was unable to retain an already captive student population, which 
                                                 
32 In 1960, 5% of the haciendas (productive agricultural units) owned 80% of the land, while 80% of 




resulted in only a low number of students completing the education cycle. On average 
only 53% of the Latin American population in selected countries had access to 
primary school in 1960; nevertheless, barely 14%—nearly one quarter of those who 
registered—finished school. In contrast, 33% of the population in the HPAE were 
enrolled at least in primary school, but 18%—more than half—finished satisfactorily. 
The relatively low proportion of population without any type of formal instruction in 
Latin America reflects the ability of the education system to attract students, but it 
obscures the high percentage of students who drop out at the end of the first or second 
year of primary school. These dropouts could expand the ranks of those with limited 
or no preparation and who, in the most extreme case, would have represented 71% of 
the total population. The diagnosis was similar for secondary education and above in 
both regions. On balance, 31% of the total population of the HPAE had at least 
completed primary school in 1960, while in the countries analyzed in Latin America 
that figure rose to 29% of the population. In spite of attempts to recruit a larger 
number of students, which implied a major fiscal effort, there was a lower 
accumulation of human capital in Latin America. 
 
  Likewise, the potential for accumulation of human capital was favorable for 
Asian economies. For generations born in the 1960s, the possibilities for securing a 
basic education were significantly superior to those in Latin America. The rates of net 




respectively, in the HPAE compared with 83% and 25%, respectively, in Latin 
America33. 
 
Another interesting finding from the data is the case of Chile. Although the 
social improvements achieved by Chile do not resemble those recorded by most 
HPAE’s, the positive relationship between acceptable initial complementary 
conditions to trade and well-being is strong. Chile was the best-equipped Latin 
American economy, in terms of labor force education and distribution of other 
productive assets, to take advantage of progressive trade openness (Table Nº 11). At 
the same time, it was the most successful economy in achieving human development 











                                                 
33 The net rate of registration is the ratio between the students registered in an education level at the 
ages corresponding to that level and the entire population of that age. The gross rate of registration is 
the ratio between the total number of students enrolled in a respective education level, without 
considering age, and the total population of that age cohort. To further explore the analysis of rates of 




Chapter 7: Conclusions and Policy Implications 
 
In times in which the global community is going through an unavoidable 
process of integration with irreversible effects on the distribution of benefits and 
burdens across societies, assessing the impact of free trade on well-being becomes an 
important task. Addressing such a complex interaction, however, requires a good 
understanding of the true nature of the relationship between the forces shaping 
globalization and those fostering human development. Only after that, effective 
policies, at the national and international level, could be designed and implemented 
with the primary goal to reduce the already existent but increasing tensions created by 
the new economic model, whose consequences, unfortunately, have overflowed the 
frontiers defined by markets and could compromise the viability of the international 
order itself. 
 
Based on very limited empirical and theoretical support, the argument that 
trade liberalization is a “one-size-fits-all” solution to development -with little regard 
to the social, economic, institutional, political and geographic particularities of each 
society- has already had profound effects in the developing world, by shaping trade 
policy in these economies and by creating expectations that are well beyond its reach. 
In the end, good intentions from fervent supporters of free trade could unchain the 
exactly opposite effect: new waves of frustration leading to potential social distress in 





This investigation intended to contribute to the existing literature not only by 
incorporating new data and methodological approaches, but particularly by 
suggesting new and fresh ways to look at the interactions between trade openness and 
well-being. It also hopes to contribute to reconciling trade theory and empirical 
evidence on trade and development. Specifically, it insinuates the kind of free trade 
policies with greater potential to positively affect living standards, and the 
circumstances under which those policies may enhance their potentialities for human 
progress.  
 
Three main lessons can be drawn from the whole analysis. First, trade 
liberalization tied to no external market concessions may report just short-term, 
specific, and limited welfare gains. One-sided reduction in trade protection, for 
example, may be a justified response under broad economic reform programs aimed 
at stabilizing relative prices and macroeconomic aggregates. Such policy could also 
be defensible if intended to define a consistent tariff structure according to the 
characteristics and comparative advantages of the economy. Lastly, the unilateral 
abandonment of trade restrictive policies, such as the dismantlement of subsidy 
programs, is a positive step when rent-seeking practices take advantage from policies 
supposedly designed to address much more benevolent purposes, as the correction of 
market failures and the search of improvements in efficiency. For the most part, trade 
theory, evidence from General Equilibrium Models (GEM’s), and results from this 
investigation, suggest that the unilateral liberalization of trade may result in a zero-




eventual changes in tax and social policy, and the recomposition of the labor market) 
prevail over the wealth-generating ones.  
 
The “bulk” of the gains from trade integration seems to be associated with 
global market access. This is the second lesson. Given the fact that the more direct 
and the greater impact of trade liberalization on household’s income is channeled 
through adjustments in labor markets, the significant enlargement of market size may 
report net welfare returns since it has the potential to account for very significant 
changes on production and the demand for employment. And, because global market 
access is not a public good, the shortcut to aspire to it is, unavoidably, the reciprocal 
conferral of trade concessions through bilateral or multilateral trade negotiations. In 
this sense, calls for multiparty, reciprocal, and fair “rules of the game” governing 
international trade seem to find empirical support. Even classic trade theory, the most 
simplistic and optimistic portray of the impacts of trade integration, conveys such 
claim by predicting shared gains among participants of free trade only if cross-the-
border trade restrictions are eliminated proportionally. 
 
Finally, a third and fundamental lesson can be extracted: complementary 
polices and initial conditions are very important. Even by considerably expanding 
international market access, multilateral trade liberalization may not yield the 
expected positive results on well-being in the absence of some important favorable 
internal conditions. In this sense, multiparty and symmetric trade openness represents, 




sense that some policies at the reach of national authorities, such as improvements in 
different dimensions of business competitiveness, the enforcement of the rule of law, 
the respect for democratic values, and the progressive inclusion of individuals as 
citizens and participants in formal markets, can make a difference in terms of human 
progress in a context of free trade, which, by the way, no society is able to escape. 
Likewise, although structural inequality is very difficult to overcome since it is rooted 
in historical and cultural phenomena and geography is immutable, the recognition of 
their role in shaping the impact of trade reform on well-being may be used in raising 
awareness about the importance of the implementation of policies to offset their 
potential damage on overall welfare. Examples of such policies are those aimed at 
reducing the disparities in education achievements and health status across the 
socioeconomic ladder, the creation of job training programs for displaced workers, 
and the implementation of conditional cash-transfer schemes. Overall, the presented 
finings support the implementation of policies conducive to a “National Agenda for 
Trade”, aimed at identifying and putting into practice sectorial policies with high 
potentialities for human development in a context of free trade.  
 
The study should be clear at this point: according to the findings, trade 
openness, particularly access to international markets, is a necessary but not sufficient 
condition to reach prosperity. By the same token, complementary policies initial 
conditions are important to aspire to higher living standards, but through the 
exploitation of the opportunities offered by progressive reciprocal trade integration. 




The conditional relationship between trade openness and well-being leads to a 
second thought: even though both symmetric international “rules of the game” and 
favorable complementary internal polices appear to jointly report a significant impact 
on living standards, it seems that the actual political debate, particularly in the 
developing world, is currently giving the first one a remarkable priority. This 
partiality in overweighting the unfair trade treatment as  “the” explanatory cause of 
the world’s poor misfortune maybe risky, and unfortunately, it has already influenced 
public policy in low and middle-income countries. In fact, most emerging economies, 
judging by their budget priorities and the allocation of fiscal revenues, are placing 
little attention to creating safety nets or reallocating social spending in favor of the 
most vulnerable as a cushion against external shocks originated by the 
internationalization of trade. Tanzi (2000) at global scale and Rey Marulanda, Ugaz 
and Guzman (2006) for 19 Latin American countries show evidence suggesting that 
neither the increase on public spending nor a less regressive execution of fiscal 
resources in favor of the poor have occurred in both settings when global integration 
was in steady expansion. In this sense, the most valuable message from this 
investigation lies in the importance that both the reciprocal access to international 
markets and the pursuit of favorable complementary conditions should receive in the 
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Graph Nº 4 
 




















Source: Reinhart and Rogoff (2003). 1/ Fixed regimes aggregates de following cases: No separate legal tender; 
pre announced peg or currency board arrangement; pre announced horizontal band that is narrower than or 
equal to +/-2%; de facto peg; pre announced crawling peg; pre announced crawling band that is narrower than 
or equal to +/-2%; de factor crawling peg; and de facto crawling band that is narrower than or equal to +/-2%. 
Flexible regimes aggregates: moving band that is narrower than or equal to +/-2% (i.e., allows for both 
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Trade Policy vs. Selected Indicators of Quality of Life: 1980-1995 





































                                                                                     
 
Graph Nº 5a Graph Nº 5b 
 























                                                                                    
 
Graph Nº 5c Graph Nº 5d 
 





















-100 -50 0 50 100
e ( Tariffs, average annual 





















































-100 -50 0 50 100
e ( Tariffs, average annual 

































e ( Tariffs, average annual 





























e ( Tariffs, average annual 




Graph Nº 6 
 
Alternative Well-Being Measures and GDP per capita, 1980-1995: Simple Correlations 
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Graph Nº 7 
 
Trade Protection and Income, 2000 
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 Graph Nº 8 
 
Unilateral (Imposed Restrictions) vs. Multilateral (Faced Restrictions) Trade Openness, 2000 
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Graph Nº 9 
 
Human Development and Trade Integration (Club 1) 
 
Public Infrastructure (Main telephone lines per 1,000 individuals)  
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Graph Nº 10 
 
Human Development and Trade Integration (Club 2) 
 
Democracy (Polity Score)  
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Graph Nº 10g Graph Nº 10h 
 
Source: Kee, Nicita and Olarreaga (2005); Human Development Report (2005); Polity Database (2005); 
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Graph Nº 11 
 
Human Development and Trade Integration (Club 3) 
 
Cultural and Ethnic Diversity (Ethnic Fragmentation Index)  
 
 
Less Diverse  More Diverse 
   
 
 







































                                                                                    
 























                                                                                    
 
Graph Nº 11c Graph Nº 11d 
 











-.1 0 .1 .2 .3




































-.1 -.05 0 .05 .1 .15




















-.15 -.1 -.05 0 .05 .1


















 Structural Inequality (Income Gini Coefficient 1970)  
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Graph Nº 11g Graph Nº 11h 
 
Source: Kee, Nicita and Olarreaga (2005); Human Development Report (2005); La Porta, others (1998); 







-.05 0 .05 .1 .15





























































-.05 0 .05 .1



















-.15 -.1 -.05 0 .05 .1

































1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
East Asia Latin America
 



















Table Nº 1 
 


































Vari oach Panel Analysis  (1980-2000) Cross-Country Analysis (2000)
g GDP Per Capita, PPP GDP Per Capita, PPP
Infant Mortality
Life Expectancy
Tr  Openness Trade shares, PPP-adjusted Trade shares, PPP-adjusted







Club 1: Business Competitiveness and
Market Efficiency (22 variables)
Club 2: Democracy (one variable)







Table Nº 2 
 
Fixed Effects, Panel Regression Analysis 1  
Cross-country panel data, 1980-2000, five-year periods 
BASIC EQUATION
 
Independent / Dependent Variable
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Trade Openness 1: 0.145 1.263
PPP-Adjusted Trade Shares (0.034)*** (2.028)
Trade Openness 2: -0.190 -12.819
Trade/Geography/Structural Inequality (as Frank and Romer, 1999) (0.093)*** (5.317)***
Trade Openness 3: 0.026 0.469
Tariff Liberalization (Sign-inverted average tariffs) (0.010)*** (0.501)
Public infraestructure 0.180 0.183 0.231 -6.493 -6.906 -7.542
(fixed line and tlephone suscribers per 1,000 people, in logs) (0.026)*** (0.027)*** (0.031)*** (1.577)*** (1.569)*** (4.453)***
Domestic credit depth 0.103 0.125 0.102 2.610 2.736 0.992
(domestic credit to private sector as % GDP, in logs) (0.022)*** (0.022)*** (0.028)*** (1.260)*** (1.234)*** (1.269)
Education achievement 0.053 0.066 0.040 -16.749 -17.026 -14.839
(average years of schooling over 25 years) (0.018)*** (0.019)*** (0.019)*** (2.092)*** (2.117)*** (1.829)***
Macroeconomic stability -0.006 -0.007 0.000 0.370 0.255 0.275
(inflation, in logs) (0.008) (0.009) (0.010) (0.483) (0.485) (0.429)
Democratic practices -0.003 -0.004 -0.005 -0.154 -0.110 -0.122
(polity score) (0.002) (0.002)* (0.003)*** (0.120) (0.122) (0.125)
R-sq (within) 0.854 0.849 0.860 0.745 0.753 0.780
Groups/Observations 94/402 91/392 89/333 94/402 91/392 92/345
1/ All regressions controlled by year dummies
***Statistically significant at 99% level of confidence
**Statistically significant at 95% level of confidence
*Statistically significant at 90% level of confidence






























       




Table Nº 3 
 
Fixed Effects, Panel Regression Analysis 1  
Cross-country panel data, 1980-2000, five-year periods 
INCORPORATING INTERACTION TRADE OPENNESS AND DOMESTIC CREDIT
 Independent / Dependent Variable
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Trade Openness 1: -0.094 -5.304
PPP-Adjusted Trade Shares (0.078) (4.397)***
Trade Openness 2: -0.531 -31.506
Trade/Geography/Structural Inequality (as Frank and Romer, 1999) (0.134)*** (7.716)***
Trade Openness 3: -0.066 -8.828
Tariff Liberalization (Sign-inverted average tariffs) (0.052) (2.355)***
Public infraestructure 0.190 0.183 0.238 -6.219 -7.056 -6.997
(fixed line and tlephone suscribers per 1,000 people, in logs) (0.026)*** (0.026)*** (0.031)*** (1.537)*** (0.543)*** (1.415)***
Domestic credit depth -0.121 -0.099 0.140 -12.796 -9.458 5.002
(domestic credit to private sector as % GDP, in logs) (0.069)** (0.068) (0.035)*** (3.899)*** (3.897)*** (1.581)***
Education achievement 0.053 0.053 0.039 -15.312 -16.720 -14.128
(average years of schooling over 25 years) (0.018)*** (0.019)*** (0.019)*** (2.066)*** (2.084)*** (1.781)***
Macroeconomic stability -0.007 -0.012 -0.001 0.283 -0.033 0.143
(inflation, in logs) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.471) (0.485) (0.417)
Democratic practices -0.003 -0.004 -0.005 -0.095 -0.101 -0.050
(polity score) (0.002) (0.002)*** (0.002)** (0.118) (0.120) (0.122)
Trade Openness * Domestic credit depth 0.075 0.102 -0.022 5.253 5.619 -2.245
(0.022)*** (0.030)*** (0.012)** (1.262)*** (1.706)*** (0.556)***


























                    0.760 0.795
Groups/Observations 94/402 91/392 89/333 92/343 92/344 92/345
1/ All regressions controlled by year dummies
***Statistically significant at 99% level of confidence
**Statistically significant at 95% level of confidence
*Statistically significant at 90% level of confidence










Table Nº 4 
 
Fixed Effects, Panel Regression Analysis 1  
Cross-country panel data, 1980-2000, five-year periods 
INCORPORATING INTERACTION TRADE OPENNESS AND EDUCATION ACHIEVEMENT
 Independent / Dependent Variable
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Trade Openness 1: 0.052 -5.330
PPP-Adjusted Trade Shares (0.051) (2.913)**
Trade Openness 2: -0.349 -19.058
Trade/Geography/Structural Inequality (as Frank and Romer, 1999) (0.098)*** (5.789)***
Trade Openness 3: -0.056 -5.287
Tariff Liberalization (Sign-inverted average tariffs) (0.031)** (1.608)***
Public infraestructure 0.193 0.193 0.261 -6.015 -6.744 -6.068
(fixed line and tlephone suscribers per 1,000 people, in logs) (0.027)*** (0.026)*** (0.032)*** (1.563)*** (1.555)*** (1.468)***
Domestic credit depth 0.108 0.121 0.095 3.110 2.710 0.899
(domestic credit to private sector as % GDP, in logs) (0.022)*** (0.021)*** (0.027)*** (1.253)*** (1.222)*** (0.235)
Education achievement -0.019 -0.044 0.056 -19.982 -20.021 -9.884
(average years of schooling over 25 years) (0.034) (0.033) (0.020)*** (2.311)*** (2.393)*** (2.216)***
Macroeconomic stability -0.005 -0.010 0.000 0.351 0.093 0.212
(inflation, in logs) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.476) (0.484) (0.418)
Democratic practices -0.003 -0.003 -0.005 -0.144 -0.076 -0.067
(polity score) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)*** (0.118) (0.121) (0.122)
Trade Openness * Education achievement 0.020 0.040 -0.013 1.514 1.531 -0.915
(0.008)*** (0.010)*** (0.004)*** (0.488)*** (0.591)*** (0.243)***
R-sq (within) 0.858 0.857 0.865 0.753 0.758 0.792
Groups/Observations 94/402 91/392 89/333 94/402 91/392 92/345
1/ All regressions controlled by year dummies
***Statistically significant at 99% level of confidence
**Statistically significant at 95% level of confidence
*Statistically significant at 90% level of confidence



































Table Nº 5 
 
Fixed Effects, Panel Regression Analysis 1  
Cross-country panel data, 1980-2000, five-year periods 
INCORPORATING INTERACTION TRADE OPENNESS AND PUBLIC INFRASTRUCTURE
 
Independent / Dependent Variable
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Trade Openness 1: 0.0647 -5.813
PPP-Adjusted Trade Shares (0.053) (3.090)**
Trade Openness 2: -0.357 -17.155
Trade/Geography/Structural Inequality (as Frank and Romer, 1999) (0.105)*** (6.162)***
Trade Openness 3: -0.029 -7.083
Tariff Liberalization (Sign-inverted average tariffs) (0.044) (2.044)***
Public infraestructure 0.132 0.091 0.261 -11.455 -9.315 -3.803
(fixed line and tlephone suscribers per 1,000 people, in logs) (0.036)*** (0.039)*** (0.039)*** (2.269)*** (2.340)*** (1.721)***
Domestic credit depth 0.107 0.119 0.095 3.067 2.639 0.276
(domestic credit to private sector as % GDP, in logs) (0.022)*** (0.021)*** (0.028)*** (1.253)*** (1.234)*** (1.248)
Education achievement 0.050 0.058 0.037 -15.121 -16.780 -13.245
(average years of schooling over 25 years) (0.018)*** (0.019)*** (0.019)*** (2.135)*** (2.121)*** (1.828)***
Macroeconomic stability -0.006 -0.009 0.000 0.326 0.171 0.204
(inflation, in logs) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.476) (0.488) (0.418)
Democratic practices -0.003 -0.003 -0.005 -0.116 -0.081 -0.707
(polity score) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)*** (0.119) (0.123) (0.122)
Trade Openness * Public infraestructure 0.022 0.043 -0.008 2.019 1.104 -1.221
(0.011)*** (0.013)*** (0.006) (0.672)*** (0.797) (0.321)***
R-sq (within) 0.857 0.854 0.861 0.753 0.754 0.793
Groups/Observations 89/331 89/332 89/333 92/343 92/344 92/345
1/ All regressions controlled by year dummies
***Statistically significant at 99% level of confidence
**Statistically significant at 95% level of confidence
*Statistically significant at 90% level of confidence


































Table Nº 6 
 
Fixed Effects, Panel Regression Analysis 1  
Cross-country panel data, 1980-2000, five-year periods 
INCORPORATING INTERACTION TRADE OPENNESS AND MACROECONOMIC STABILITY
 
Independent / Dependent Variable
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Trade Openness 1: 0.213 5.351
PPP-Adjusted Trade Shares (0.040)*** (2.575)***
Trade Openness 2: -0.1396 -11.438
Trade/Geography/Structural Inequality (as Frank and Romer, 1999) (0.096) (5.545)***
Trade Openness 3: 0.048 2.514
Tariff Liberalization (Sign-inverted average tariffs) (0.014)*** (0.641)***
Public infraestructure 0.194 0.182 0.240 -6.126 -6.961 -7.091
(fixed line and tlephone suscribers per 1,000 people, in logs) (0.027)*** (0.027)*** (0.030)*** (1.570)*** (1.571)*** (1.393)***
Domestic credit depth 0.099 0.127 0.099 2.545 2.816 0.947
(domestic credit to private sector as % GDP, in logs) (0.021)*** (0.022)*** (0.027)*** (1.249)*** (1.238)*** (1.213)
Education achievement 0.044 0.061 0.036 -15.49 -16.995 -13.258
(average years of schooling over 25 years) (0.018)*** (0.019)*** (0.020)** (2.132)*** (2.118)*** (1.780)***
Macroeconomic stability 0.075 0.027 -0.0361 4.697 1.180 -2.997
(inflation, in logs) (0.029)*** (0.020) (0.017)*** (1.770)*** (1.156) (0.795)***
Democratic practices -0.003 -0.0033 -0.005 -0.133 -0.100 -0.069
(polity score) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)*** (0.119) (0.122) (0.120)
Trade Openness * Macroeconomic stability -0.031 -0.018 0.016 -1.653 -0.519 1.436
(0.011)*** (0.010)*** (0.006)*** (0.651)*** (0.589) (0.299)***
R-sq (within) 0.859 0.851 0.864 0.751 0.753 0.800
Groups/Observations 94/402 91/392 89/333 94/402 91/392 92/345
1/ All regressions controlled by year dummies
***Statistically significant at 99% level of confidence
**Statistically significant at 95% level of confidence
*Statistically significant at 90% level of confidence


































Table Nº 7 
 
Fixed Effects, Panel Regression Analysis 1  
Cross-country panel data, 1980-2000, five-year periods 
INCORPORATING INTERACTION TRADE OPENNESS AND DEMOCRATIC PRACTICES
 
Independent / Dependent Variable
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Trade Openness 1: 0.150 0.852
PPP-Adjusted Trade Shares (0.034)*** (2.039)
Trade Openness 2: -0.207 -13.716
Trade/Geography/Structural Inequality (as Frank and Romer, 1999) (0.094)*** (5.389)***
Trade Openness 3: 0.069 0.310
Tariff Liberalization (Sign-inverted average tariffs) (0.024)*** (1.140)
Public infraestructure 0.176 0.1816 0.2169 -6.223 -6.976 -7.502
(fixed line and tlephone suscribers per 1,000 people, in logs) (0.026)*** (0.027)*** (0.032)*** (1.582)*** (1.571)*** (1.480)***
Domestic credit depth 0.101 0.122 0.104 2.791 2.606 0.979
(domestic credit to private sector as % GDP, in logs) (0.022)*** (0.022)*** (0.027)*** (1.626)*** (1.242)*** (0.127)
Education achievement 0.056 0.0659 0.037 -17.021 -16.921 -14.797
(average years of schooling over 25 years) (0.018)*** (0.019)*** (0.019)** (2.094)*** (2.120)*** (1.854)***
Macroeconomic stability -0.006 -0.0064 -0.002 0.425 0.261 0.279
(inflation, in logs) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.483) (0.485) (0.431)
Democratic practices 0.003 -0.009 -0.0163 -0.811 -0.449 -0.083
(polity score) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006)*** (0.431)** (0.372) (0.285)
Trade Openness * Democratic practices -0.003 0.003 0.005 0.239 0.168 -0.017
0.003 (0.003) (0.002)** (0.151)* (0.175) (0.111)
R-sq (within) 0.855 0.849 0.862 0.748 0.754 0.780
Groups/Observations 94/402 91/392 89/333 94/402 91/392 92/345
1/ All regressions controlled by year dummies
***Statistically significant at 99% level of confidence
**Statistically significant at 95% level of confidence
*Statistically significant at 90% level of confidence


































Table Nº 8 
 
OLS Cross-Country Regression Analysis 1  
ALL TRADE OPENNESS MEASURES SIMULTANEOUSLY
 
 
 Independent / Dependent Variable
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Trade Openness 1: 0.016 -0.077 0.058 -0.037
PPP-Adjusted Trade Shares (0.089) (0.121) (0.033)** (0.041)
Trade Openness 2: 0.023 0.060 0.101 0.153
Trade/Geography/Structural Inequality (as Frank and Romer, 1999) (0.094) (0.125) (0.032)*** (0.043)***
Unilateral Trade Openness -0.456 -0.428 0.157 0.279
(Overall Trade Restrictivenness Index) (0.589) (0.634) (0.239) (0.216)
Multilateral Trade Openness -2.193 -2.666 -0.782 -1.049
(Market Access Trade Restrictivenness Index) (0.959)*** (1.006)*** (0.390)** (0.344)***
Business Competitiveness 0.560 0.568 0.476 0.499 0.029 0.030 0.026 0.018
(factor component, 22 variables) (0.098)*** (0.091)*** (0.093)*** (0.099)*** (0.037) (0.030) (0.038) (0.034)
Political Rights -0.144 -0.143 -0.162 -0.170 -0.032 -0.034 -0.036 -0.036
(political rights index, Freedom House) (0.046)*** (0.045)*** (0.045)*** (0.049)*** (0.017)** (0.015)*** (0.018)** (0.016)***
Structural Inequality -0.216 -0.196 -0.3682 -0.321 -0.063 -0.078 -0.111 -0.147
(factor component, 4 variables) (0.126)** (0.123) (0.132)*** (0.138)*** (0.047) (0.041)** (0.054)** (0.047)***
 
R-sq 0.906 0.908 0.917 0.926 0.863 0.880 0.870 0.902
Nº Countries 78 77 71 69 78 77 71 69
1/ All regressions controlled by regional dummies
***Statistically significant at 99% level of confidence
**Statistically significant at 95% level of confidence
*Statistically significant at 90% level of confidence




































Table Nº 9 
 
OLS Cross-Country Regression Analysis 1    
UNILATERAL TRADE OPENNESS: INTERACTING WITH THREE “CLUBS” OF INTERNAL CONDITIONS
 
 Independent / Dependent Variable
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Unilateral Trade Openness -0.456 -0.676 -0.781 0.241 0.157 0.341 -0.316 0.158
(Overall Trade Restrictivenness Index) (0.589) (0.777) (1.933) (0.654) (0.239) (0.314) (0.783) (0.277)
Multilateral Trade Openness -2.193 -2.150 -2.246 -2.262 -0.782 -0.817 -0.858 -0.781
(Market Access Trade Restrictivenness Index) (0.959)*** (0.970)*** (1.012)*** (0.930)*** (0.390)** (0.392)** (0.410)** (393)**
Business Competitiveness 0.476 0.543 0.475 0.483 0.026 -0.028 0.025 0.027
(factor component, 22 variables) (0.093)*** (0.179)*** (0.094)*** (0.909)*** (0.038) (0.724) (0.038) (0.038)
Political Rights -0.162 -0.159 -0.174 -0.188 -0.036 -0.038 -0.052 -0.036
(political rights index, Freedom House) (0.045)*** (0.046)*** (0.079)*** (0.045)*** (0.018)** (0.018)** (0.032)* (0.019)**
Structural Inequality -0.3682 -0.357 -0.369 -0.129 -0.111 -0.121 -0.113 -0.111
(factor component, 4 variables) (0.132)*** (0.136)*** (0.134)*** (0.169) (0.054)** (0.055)** (0.054)** (0.071)
Unilateral Trade Openness * Business Competitiveness -0.440 0.367
(1.001) (0.404)
Unilateral Trade Openness * Political Rights 0.073 0.106
(0.414) (0.167)
Unilateral Trade Openness * Structural Inequality -1.431 -0.002
(0.655)*** 0.277
R-sq 0.917 0.924 0.924 0.930 0.870 0.872 0.870 0.870
Nº Countries 71 71 71 71 71 71 71 71
1/ All regressions controlled by regional dummies
***Statistically significant at 99% level of confidence
**Statistically significant at 95% level of confidence
*Statistically significant at 90% level of confidence





































Table Nº 10 
 
OLS Cross-Country Regression Analysis 1  
INTERNATIONAL MARKET ACCESS (MULTILATERAL TRADE OPENNESS): INTERACTING WITH THREE “CLUBS” OF 
INTERNAL CONDITIONS
 
 Independent / Dependent Variable
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Unilateral Trade Openness -0.456 -0.633 -0.379 -0.574 0.157 0.113 0.229 0.101
(Overall Trade Restrictivenness Index) (0.589) (0.591) (0.587) (0.585) (0.239) (0.243) (0.239) (0.236)
Multilateral Trade Openness -2.193 -1.470 0.477 -1.718 -0.782 -0.602 0.492 -0.560
(Market Access Trade Restrictivenness Index) (0.959)*** (1.043) (2.147) (0.989)** (0.390)** (0.430) (0.889) (0.399)
Business Competitiveness 0.476 0.235 0.468 0.482 0.026 -0.032 0.027 0.029
(factor component, 22 variables) (0.093)*** (0.174) (0.092)*** (0.092)*** (0.038) (0.071) (0.037) (0.037)
Political Rights -0.162 -0.144 -0.060 -0.152 -0.036 -0.031 0.023 -0.031
(political rights index, Freedom House) (0.045)*** (0.046)*** (0.086) (0.045)*** (0.018)** (0.019)* (0.037) (0.018)*
Structural Inequality -0.368 -0.372 -0.376 -0.124 -0.111 -0.113 -0.138 0.002
(factor component, 4 variables) (0.132)*** (0.131)*** (0.487)*** (0.199) (0.054)** (0.054)** (0.055)*** (0.080)
Multilateral Trade Openness * Business Competitiveness 1.723 0.426
(1.053)*  (0.434)
 
Multilateral Trade Openness * Political Rights -0.675 -0.358
(0.487) (0.210)*
Multilateral Trade Openness * Structural Inequality -1.840 -0.854
(1.125)* (0.454)*
R-sq 0.917 0.927 0.926 0.927 0.870 0.872 0.878 0.877
Nº Countries 71 71 71 71 71 71 71 71
1/ All regressions controlled by regional dummies
***Statistically significant at 99% level of confidence
**Statistically significant at 95% level of confidence
*Statistically significant at 90% level of confidence
(US$2000) Rates

































Table Nº 11 
 





Living GDP Life HDI
Standard1 per capita2 Expectancy3 1960
Index (US$ 1985) (Años) Index
LAC
Argentina 0.49 4,481 65 0.67
Mexico 0.38 2,825 57 0.52
Brazil 0.30 1,780 55 0.39
Chile 0.39 2,897 57 0.58
Colombia 0.29 1,686 57 0.47
Peru 0.32 2,031 48 0.42 
Simple Average 0.36 2,617 57 0.51
 
HPAE's
Singapur 0.29 1,626 64 0.52
Korea 0.21 898 54 0.40
Hong Kong 0.34 2,231 66 0.56
Thailand 0.21 940 53 0.37
Malaysia 0.27 1,409 54 0.33
Indonesia 0.17 641 41 0.22
Simple Average 0.25 1,291 55 0.40
1/ Square root of GDP per capita. Penn Tables
2/GDP per capita PPP, 1960




Table Nº 12 
 
Human Development Indicators: 1990 
 
Living GDP Life HDI
Standard1 per capita2 Expectancy3 1990
Index (US$ 1985) (Años) Index
LAC
Argentina 0.50 4,708 74 0.84
Mexico 0.56 5,825 72 0.80
Brazil 0.46 4,043 67 0.76
Chile 0.48 4,335 76 0.83
Colombia 0.42 3,303 70 0.77
Peru 0.34 2,189 69 0.75
Simple Average 0.46 4,067 71 0.79
HPAE's
Singapur 0.80 11,698 78 0.89
Korea 0.60 6,665 73 0.88
Hong Kong 0.90 14,854 80 0.89
Thailand 0.43 3,570 69 0.76
Malaysia 0.52 5,117 72 0.78
Indonesia 0.32 1,973 66 0.68
Simple Average 0.59 7,313 73 0.81
1/ Square root of GDP per capita. Penn Tables
2/GDP per capita PPP, 1990





Table Nº 13 
 
Gini Gini No Enroll. Enroll. Illiteracy
Income Land Educ. Tot Full Tot Full Tot Full Primary1 Second1  
Index Index (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
LAC
Argentina 0.86 12 73.4 19.9 11.6 5.3 3 1.8 95 34 7
Mexico 0.57 0.62 46 48.3 10.4 4.3 1.5 1.4 0.8 83 17 25
Brazil 0.53 0.83 43.1 42.8 11.6 12.1 4.3 2 1.4 70 17 32
Chile 0.46 20.2 55.3 22.1 22.4 11 2.1 1.4 90 28 12
Colombia 0.52 0.86 35.1 51.3 10.9 11.9 3.9 1.9 1.3 .. .. 22
Peru 0.55 0.94 42.8 44.9 11.7 9.7 4.1 2.6 1.8 78 27 28 
Simple Average 0.52 0.82 33.2 52.7 14.4 12.0 5.0 2.2 1.4 83 25 21
  
HPAE's
Singapur 0.39 . 54.3 20.6 8.3 25 8.3 0 0 94 44 27
Korea 0.32 0.35 56.9 29.6 26.2 10.9 5.8 2.6 1.9 94 38 13
Hong Kong 0.41 . 30.8 47.1 19.3 17.3 8.1 4.7 2.7 87 33 22
Thailand 0.42 0.46 48.1 46.4 33.9 4.9 1.6 0.6 0.6 .. .. 20
Malaysia 0.51 0.75 58.5 32.7 11.5 7.2 2.4 1.5 1.3 88 33 42
Indonesia 0.33 0.55 75.5 22.6 7.6 1.9 0.5 0.1 0 72 .. 44
Simple Average 0.40 0.53 54.0 33.2 17.8 11.2 4.5 1.6 1.1 87 37 28
Source: Deininger and Squire (1996), Barro and Lee (1994), World Bank (2002)











Appendix Nº 1 
 
Data Description and Sources 
 
   
Variable Description Source 
   
   
Well-being   
   
   




   
Infant Mortality Infant mortality rates, per 1,000 live 
births (in logs) 
World Development 
Indicators 
   
Life Expectancy Life expectancy, years (in logs) World Development 
Indicators 
   
   
   
Trade Openness   
   
   
Measure 1: Trade Shares, 
PPP-adjusted 
Ratio of the summation of total 
imports and exports and GDP 
expressed purchasing power parity 
terms, in logs 
World Development 
Indicators 
   
Predicted trade shares based on a 
gravitational model using 
geographical variables as calculated 
in Frank and Romer (1999), in logs 
Lopez-Córdova and 
Meissner (2005) 
Measure 2: Trade Shares, 
predicted 
   
Measure 3: Average 
Tariffs 
Total tariff revenues as share of 
total imports, in logs 
World Development 
Indicators 
   
Overall Trade Restrictiveness 
Index, which measures the overall 
equivalent ad valorem tariff rate 
imposed by each country on 
imports. Built with information 
from tariff rates, NTB’s, and trade-
restraining subsidies (including 
those adopted in the agricultural 
sector). Higher values correspond to 
higher levels of protection. 
Kee, Nicita, and Olarreaga 
(2005) 
Measure 4: Unilateral 
Trade Openness 
   
Overall Market Access Index, 
which measures the overall 
equivalent ad valorem tariff rate 
faced by each country’s exports in 
the rest of the world. Built with 
information from tariff rates, 
NTB’s, and trade-restraining 
Kee, Nicita, and Olarreaga 
(2005) 





subsidies (including those adopted 
in the agricultural sector). Higher 
values correspond to higher trade 
restrictions to access international 
markets. 
   
   
Internal Conditions   
   
   
Public Infrastructure Fixed phone lines subscribers (per 
1,000), in logs 
World Development 
Indicators 
   
Domestic Credit Total credit to private sector (as % 
of GDP), in logs 
World Development 
Indicators 
   
Education Achievement Average years of schooling, 
population over 25 years 
Barro and Lee (2000) 
   




   
Democratic Practices Polity Score Polity Project 
   
Club 1: Business 
Competitiveness and  
Principal factor component from 22 
variables linked to business 
competitiveness and market 
efficiency, as follows: 
Author’s own calculations 
Market Efficiency 
   
Growth Competitiveness Index: 
The quality of the macroeconomic 
environment, the state of the 
country’s public institutions, and 
the level of the country’s 
technological readiness (1=lower, 
7=higher) 
World Economic Forum  
   
Auditing and accounting standards: 
Financial auditing and reporting 
standards regarding company 
financial performance in your 
country are (1=extremely weak, 
7=strong) among the best in the 
world 
World Economic Forum  
   
Local supplier quality: The quality 
of local suppliers in your country is 
(1=poor, as they are inefficient and 
have little technological capability, 
7=very good, as they are 
internationally competitive and 
assist in new product and process 
development) 




   
Intensity of Local Competition: 
Competition in the local market is 
(1=limited in most industries and 
price-cutting is rare, 7=intense in 
most industries as market leadership 
changes over time) 
World Economic Forum  
   
Company Spending on Research 
and Development: Companies in 
your country (1= do not spend 
money on research and 
development, 7=spend heavily on 
research and development relative 
to international peers) 
World Economic Forum  
   
Local Equity Market Access: 
Raising money by issuing shares on 
the local stock market is (1=nearly 
impossible, 7=quite possible for a 
good company) 
World Economic Forum  
   
 Fixed line and mobile phone 
subscribers (per 1,000 individuals) 
World Development 
Indicators 
   
Postal Efficiency: Do you trust your 
country’s postal system sufficiently 
to have a friend mail a small 
package worth US$100 to you? 
(1=not at all, 7=yes, trust the 
system entirely) 
World Economic Forum  
   
 Port Efficiency Index: Port facilities 
and inland waterways in your 
country are (1=underdeveloped, 
7=as developed as the world’s best) 
World Economic Forum 
   
Air Transport Infrastructure 
Quality: Passenger air transport in 
your country is (1=infrequent and 
inefficient, 7=as extensive and 
efficient as the world’s best) 
World Economic Forum  
   
 Railroad Infrastructure 
Development: Railroads in your 
country are (1=underdeveloped, 
7=as extensive and efficient as the 
world’s best) 
World Economic Forum 
   




General infrastructure in your 
country is (1=poorly developed and 
inefficient, 7=among the best in the 
world) 
   
 Total Credit (as % of GDP) World Development 
Indicators 
   
Financial Market Sophistication: 
The level of sophistication of 
financial markets in your country is 
(1=lower than international norms, 
7=higher than international norms) 
World Economic Forum  
   
 Technological Readiness: Your 
country’s level of technological 
readiness (1=generally lags behind 
most other countries, 7=is among 
the world leaders) 
World Economic Forum 
   
Rule of Law Index: Measures 
institutional quality, one of the six 
indices on institutional quality 
developed by Kaufmann, Kraay and 
Zoido-Lobaton (2002). The index 
values fluctuate between –2.5 and 
2.5; the highest values are 
associated to societies where 
adherence to the law is 
predominant.  
Kaufmann, Kraay and 
Zoido-Lobaton (2002). 
 
   
Irregular Payments in Judicial 
Decisions: In your industry, how 
commonly would you estimate that 
firms make undocumented extra 
payments or bribes connected with 
getting favorable judicial decisions? 
(1=common, 7=never occurs) 
World Economic Forum  
   
Judicial Independence: Is the 
judiciary in your country 
independent from political 
influences of members of 
government, citizens, or firms? 
(1=no, heavily influenced, 7=yes, 
entirely independent) 
World Economic Forum  
   
Property Rights Index: Property 
rights, including over financial 
assets, are (1=poorly defined and 
not protected by law, 7=clearly 







defined and well protected by law) 
   
 Extend of Informal Sector: How 
much business activity in your 
country would you estimate to be 
unofficial or unregistered? (1=none, 
all business are registered, 7=more 
than 50% of economic activity is 
unrecorded) 
World Economic Forum 
   
 Time for Export: time necessary to 
comply with all procedures required 
to export (days) 
Doing Business 
   
 Time for Import: time necessary to 
comply with all procedures required 
to import (days) 
Doing Business 
   
Club 2: Political Rights Political Rights Index (1=more 
extended political rights, 7=less 
extended use of political rights) 
Freedom House 
   
Club 3: Structural 
Inequality  
Principal factor component from 4 
variables linked to structural 
inequality, as follows: 
Author’s own calculations 
   
 Distance to the Equator (degrees) Rodrik (2002) 
   
 Income Gini Coefficient (Average 
1980-2000) 
Deininger and Squire (2001) 
   
 Malaria Ecology Index: Index of 
malaria risk transmission that 
combines data on temperature, 
mosquito abundance of the type 
plasmodium falciparum, and vector 
type (preference for human or 
animal blood). 
Sachs (2003) 
   
 Ethnic Fragmentation Index La Porta; others (1999) 
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Appendix Nº 3 
 




Nº Country Nº Country Nº Country
1 Albania 26 Honduras 51 Philippines 
2 Algeria 27 Hungary 52 Poland 
3 Argentina 28 India 53 Portugal 
4 Australia 29 Indonesia 54 Romania 
5 Austria 30 Ireland 55 South Africa 
6 Bangladesh 31 Italy 56 Spain 
7 Belgium 32 Japan 57 Sri Lanka 
8 Bolivia 33 Jordan 58 Sweden 
9 Brazil 34 Kenya 59 Switzerland 
10 Cameroon 35 Madagascar 60 Tanzania, U. Rep. of 
11 Canada 36 Malawi 61 Thailand 
12 Chad 37 Malaysia 62 Trinidad and Tobago 
13 Chile 38 Mali 63 Tunisia 
14 China 39 Mauritius 64 Turkey 
15 Colombia 40 Mexico 65 Uganda 
16 Costa Rica 41 Morocco 66 United Kingdom 
17 Denmark 42 Mozambique 67 United States 
18 Ecuador 43 Netherlands 68 Uruguay 
19 El Salvador 44 New Zealand 69 Venezuela 
20 Ethiopia 45 Nicaragua 70 Vietnam 
21 Finland 46 Nigeria 71 Zimbabwe 
22 France 47 Norway 
23 Ghana 48 Pakistan 
24 Greece 49 Paraguay 

































Annex Nº 4 
 
OLS Instrumental Variables Cross-Country Regression Analysis 1  
BASIC EQUATION
 
Independent / Dependent Variable Club1 Club 1
(1) (2) 
Settler Mortality Rates (in logs) -0.253 -0.257
(0.108)*** (0.103)***
Independent / Dependent Variable GDP Per Capita PPP Life Expectancy
(US$2000) Rates
(1) (2)
Unilateral Trade Openness -1.173 -0.055
(Overall Trade Restrictivenness Index) (0.744)* (0.244)
Multilateral Trade Openness -2.270 -0.778
(Market Access Trade Restrictivenness Index) (1.447)* (0.453)**
Business Competitiveness 1.023 -0.114
(factor component, 22 variables) (0.301)*** (0.096)
Political Rights 0.054 -0.056
(political rights index, Freedom House) (0.097) (0.030)**
Structural Inequality -0.232 -0.171
(factor component, 4 variables) (0.202) (0.065)**
 
R-sq 0.798 0.863
Nº Countries 37 41
1/ All regressions controlled by regional dummies
***Statistically significant at 99% level of confidence
**Statistically significant at 95% level of confidence
*Statistically significant at 90% level of confidence
FIRST STAGE REGRESSIONS
SECOND STAGE REGRESSIONS
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